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Explanatory Standards in the Age of
Powerful Machines
Kiel Brennan-Marquez*
The Fourth Amendment's probable cause requirement is not about
numbers or statistics. It is about requiring the police to account for their
decisions. For a theory of wrongdoing to satisfy probable cause-and warrant
a search or seizure-it must be plausible. The police must be able to explain why
the observed facts invite an inference of wrongdoing, and judges must have an
opportunity to scrutinize that explanation.
Until recently, the explanatory aspect of Fourth Amendment
suspicion-"plausible cause" -has been uncontroversial, and central to the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence, for a simple reason: explanations have served,
in practice, as a guarantor of statistical likelihood. In other words, forcing
police to articulate theories of wrongdoing is the means by which courts have
traditionally ensured that (roughly) the right "persons, houses, papers, and
effects" are targeted for intrusion. Going forward, however, technological
change promises to disrupt the harmony between explanatory standards and
statistical accuracy. Powerful machines enable a previously impossible
combination: accurate predictions unaccompanied by explanations. As that
change takes hold, we will need to think carefully about why explanation-giving
matters. When judges assess the sufficiency of explanations offered by police
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(and other officials), what are they doing? If the answer comes back to error-
reduction-if the point of judicial oversight is simply to maximize the overall
number of accurate decisions-machines could theoretically do the job as well
as, if not better than, humans. But if the answer involves normative goals
beyond error-reduction, automated tools-no matter their power-will remain,
at best, partial substitutes for judicial scrutiny.
This Article defends the latter view. I argue that statistical accuracy,
though important, is not the crux of explanation-giving. Rather, explanatory
standards-like probable cause-hold officials accountable to a plurality of
sometimes-conflicting constitutional and rule-of-law values that, in our legal
system, bound the scope of legitimate authority. Error-reduction is one such
value. But there are many others, and sometimes the values work at cross
purposes. When judges assess explanations, they navigate a space of value-
pluralism: they identify which values are at stake in a given decisional
environment and ask, where necessary, if those values have been properly
balanced. Unexplained decisions render this process impossible and, in so
doing, hobble the judicial role. Ultimately, that role has less to do with analytic
power than practiced wisdom. A common argument against replacing judges,
and other human experts, with intelligent machines is that machines are not
(yet) intelligent enough to take up the mantle. In the age of powerful algorithms,
however, this turns out to be a weak-and temporally limited-claim. The better
argument, I suggest in closing, is that judging is not solely, or even primarily,
about intelligence. It is about prudence.
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INTRODUCTION
Suppose, in the near future, that police start using an
algorithmic tool-the Contraband Detector-to locate residences likely
to contain illegal weapons. When the tool was first developed, its
outputs were thirty percent accurate. With time, however, machine
learning refined the tool.1 Now its accuracy rate hovers around eighty
percent, and data scientists, having recently "audited" the Contraband
Detector,2 report that the tool's performance will only continue to
improve. When the tool locates a suspicious residence, it does not
explain why; it simply displays an address. And because of the tool's
complexity-it draws on more than one hundred input-variables-
officers have no idea which variables are determinative in a given case.3
Here is the puzzle. Imagine the Contraband Detector, deployed
in New York City, turns up "285 Court St., Apt. 2L," prompting the
NYPD to seek a search warrant. When the judge asks about probable
cause, the officers point to one, and only one, fact: the tool's performance
rate.4 Should the judge sign the warrant? Or better yet:
Could the judge's role in the process simply be eliminated-at least in
principle-such that any time the tool identifies a suspicious residence,
1. For background, see, for example, Harry Surden, Machine Learning and the Law, 89
WASH. L. REV. 87, 89 (2014) (explaining that "'[miachine learning' refers to a subfield of computer
science concerned with computer programs . . . [that] are capable of changing their behavior to
enhance their performance on some task through experience"); and id. at 90-95 and accompanying
notes (elaborating the techniques behind machine learning, and discussing spam filters as a case
study).
2. See Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633 (2017) (arguing
that the use of computer systems and algorithms in governance should involve accountability and
oversight).
3. I borrow here from Orin Kerr's well-known "Harvard dorm room" hypothetical, which
imagines "a scientific study by top Harvard scientists showing that marijuana can be found in 60%
of Harvard dormitory rooms," and asks whether the study's finding, standing alone, generates
cause to search any given dorm room. See Orin Kerr, Why Courts Should Not Quantify Probable
Cause, in THE POLITICAL HEART OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: ESSAYS ON THEMES OF WILLIAM J.
STUNTZ 131, 135-37 (Michael Klarman, David Skeel & Carol Steiker eds., 2012); see also Jane
Bambauer, Hassle, 113 MICH. L. REV. 461, 462 n.2 (2015) (modifying Kerr's hypothetical-as I do-
to make the selection of a specific target genuinely random, rather than deliberate but
underdetermined).
4. It bears noting that the performance of a detection tool (like the Contraband Detector)
can be measured along multiple dimensions, and I am focusing here on what statisticians call
"precision": comparing a detection method's true-positive rate to its false-positive rate. Another
dimension of accuracy is "sensitivity": comparing a detection method's true-positive rate to its
false-negative rate. Whereas precision focuses on how often a detection method makes improper
selections, sensitivity focuses on how often a method neglects to make proper selections. See
RICARDO BAEZA-YATES & BERTHIER RIBEIRO-NETO, MODERN INFORMATION RETRIEVAL (2d ed.
2011) (discussing computer-centered information retrieval). In Fourth Amendment law, we are
often unconcerned with false-negatives, because false-negatives by their nature involve no
intrusion. From an overall governance perspective, however, the distinction is important;
sensitivity often implicates equality and neutrality concerns that precision does not.
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a search warrant issues automatically?5 In other words, suppose the
next generation of tool, operating on the same logic, is not a Contraband
Detector, but an Automatic Warrant Machine. Assuming the tool
continues to perform at a high level of statistical precision, would its
use-in lieu of judicial oversight-be consistent with the Fourth
Amendment?
There is a powerful and widespread intuition that the answer to
these questions is no.6 Performance aside, blind reliance on an
algorithmic tool feels uncomfortable. It misses the point of
particularized suspicion.7 But why? On its face, probable cause would
seem to depend on the probability that a "person[ ], house[ ], paper[ ] or
effect[ ]" is linked to wrongdoing." In the example, it is eighty percent
5. Cf. Betsy Cooper, Judges in Jeopardy!: Could IBM's Watson Beat Courts at Their Own
Game?, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 87, 96-99 (2011) (exploring the advantages and drawbacks of having
machine learning programs hypothetically replace textualist judges).
6. See Kerr, supra note 3 (arguing against the quantification of probable cause); Michael L.
Rich, Machine Learning, Automated Suspicion Algorithms, and the Fourth Amendment, 164 U. PA.
L. REV. 871, 898-901 (2016) (arguing that purely algorithmic inferences of suspicion defy the
"totality-of-the-circumstances" ideal); see also Bruce A. Antkowiak, Saving Probable Cause, 40
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 569, 586 (2007) (arguing for skepticism about using "mathematical concepts
to solve the probable cause riddle"); cf. Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and
Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1330-31 (1971) (defending the value of human
intelligibility in the trial process).
7. See Ronald J. Bacigal, Making the Right Gamble: The Odds on Probable Cause, 74 MISS.
L.J. 279, 295-96 (2004) (noting the law's "[discomfort] with relying wholly on base rates and
making the leap from aggregate likelihood to a conclusion of probable cause in a specific case,"
despite the epistemic equivalence-at some level-of base rate evidence, on the one hand, and
"individuating" evidence, on the other); Sherry F. Colb, Probabilities in Probable Cause and
Beyond: Statistical Versus Concrete Harms, 73 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 69, 71-78 (2010)
(suggesting that suspicion ceases to seem individualized if false-positives are treated as an
anticipated statistical category, rather than the outcome of isolated errors); Andrew Guthrie
Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 327, 331 (2015)
(suggesting that predictive policing represents a departure from the traditional, "small data"
notion of suspicion as stemming from the "specific, observable actions of unknown suspects"); cf.
Ronald J. Allen, On the Significance of Batting Averages and Strikeout Totals: A Clarification of
the "Naked Statistical Evidence" Debate, the Meaning of "Evidence," and the Requirement of Proof
Beyond A Reasonable Doubt, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1093, 1104 (1991) (arguing that statistical approaches
to guilt-at trial-feel uncomfortable because statistics cannot assure a fact-finder that no
plausible innocent explanation of the observed facts exists).
8. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (protecting "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects"). A number of scholars have recently taken up the banner of
probability-based probable cause-often in the hope of revitalizing Fourth Amendment protection.
See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEw GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT 37-46 (2007) (proposing a proportionality analysis for determining the level
of suspicion necessary for searches and seizure); Bambauer, supra note 3, at 483 (arguing that
courts should evaluate individualized suspicion based on the "hassle" rate of a given search or
seizure); Bernard E. Harcourt & Tracey L. Meares, Randomization and the Fourth Amendment,
78 U. CHI. L. REV. 809, 811 (2011) (promoting randomization as the "lodestar" for Fourth
Amendment reasonableness); Ric Simmons, Quantifying Criminal Procedure: How to Unlock the
Potential of Big Data in Our Criminal Justice System, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV 947, 951 (promoting
the use of big data in the criminal justice system for determinations of both probable cause and
reasonable suspicion). I disagree with these accounts to the extent they reduce suspicion
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probable that 285 Court St., Apt. 2L contains an illegal weapon. So
probable cause, literally construed, should be satisfied.
I propose a simple solution to this puzzle. For probable cause to
be satisfied, an inference of wrongdoing must be plausible-the police
must be able to explain why observed facts give rise to the inference.9
And judges must have an opportunity to scrutinize that explanation: to
test its overall intelligibility; to weigh it against the best innocent
account on the other side; and to evaluate its consistency with
background values, flowing from the Constitution, from general legality
principles, and from other sources of positive law.10
exclusively to statistical measures. See infra Part II. Whether this is true of each specific account
is not entirely clear. Some scholars are openly enthusiastic about allowing statistical measures to
supplant explanations. See, e.g., Harcourt & Meares, supra, at 811 ("We contend that the model of
the randomized checkpoint should serve as the lodestar for reasonableness . .. and that the concept
of 'individualized suspicion' should be abandoned."). Other scholars are interested in normative
values-for example, keeping suspicion requirements proportional to both the state interest and
intrusion involved-that seem to entail a statistical approach. See, e.g., SLOBOGIN, supra, at 21
(advancing the "proportionality principle" as the way to conceptualize the reasonableness of a
search or seizure).
9. The distinction between probability and plausibility, as I am using it, focuses on the
difference between prediction and explanation. To ask whether an inference is probable is to assess
its numerical likelihood, in light of known facts-in principle, this interpretive task can be
performed without an observer understanding why an inference is likely (or unlikely). To ask
whether an inference is plausible, by contrast, is to inquire about its explanatory power: Would
Inference X, if true, explain the existence of known facts? This interpretive task depends on an
understanding of the relationship between an inference and background facts. For further
background on the distinction, see Michael S. Pardo & Ronald J. Allen, Juridical Proof and the
Best Explanation, 27 LAw & PHIL. 223, 224 (2008) (discussing inference practices in juridical
proof); and infra Part I. For background on the specific context of pleading doctrine, see Kiel
Brennan-Marquez, The Epistemology of Twombly and Iqbal, 26 REGENT U. L. REV. 167, 172-73
(2013) (arguing that the difference between "probable" and "plausible," is a matter of category, not
degree, and that the latter demands abductive-as opposed to purely inductive-reasoning); see
also John R. Josephson, On the Proof Dynamics of Inference to the Best Explanation, 22 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1621, 1622-25 (2001) (providing an overview of abductive reasoning). For background in
the specific context of guilt determinations, see Ronald J. Allen & Alex Stein, Evidence, Probability,
and the Burden of Proof, 55 ARIz. L. REV. 557, 560 (2013) (discussing mathematical probability and
the burden of proof); and Michael S. Pardo, The Nature and Purpose of Evidence Theory, 66 VAND.
L. REV. 547, 557-58 (2013) (discussing "theoretical accounts of evidence and proof').
10. Whether probable cause also requires that inferences of wrongdoing be probable in a
numerical sense is an interesting normative question, and one that I leave largely to one side in
this Article. For the moment, suffice it to say that nothing in the history of the Fourth Amendment,
nor in existing doctrine, suggests that mathematical notions of probability play a role in the
analysis. On the historical point, see, for example, Hon. Ronald M. Gould & Simon Stern,
Catastrophic Threats and the Fourth Amendment, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 777, 788-89 (2004)
(explaining that in old English, the term "probable" was more synonymous to "provable" than to
"statistically likely," or put otherwise, that "probable" applied in old English to propositions that
a reasonable person would have "good cause" to believe); and Joseph D. Grano, Probable Cause
and Common Sense: A Reply to the Critics of Illinois v. Gates, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 465, 490-
91 (1984) (arguing that historically, in both English cases and early U.S. Supreme Court cases, an
official's having "probable cause" was understood to mean that he had "reasonable grounds for
believing" that wrongdoing had occurred). This historical evidence has not deterred scholars from
talking about probable cause in terms of statistical probability. In fact, the standard is frequently
described that way-as a quantitative standard, reducible, in principle, to numerical benchmarks.
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This hardly means that prediction tools have no place in policing
or in other areas of governance. It means, rather, that their role is to
aid human reasoning, not to supplant it.11 Outputs from prediction
tools, like outputs from other detection instruments, such as drug
dogs,12 can certainly be among the facts that police adduce-in an
explanatory fashion-to anchor claims of wrongdoing. For that process
to work, however, a tool's outputs must be intelligible. Black-box tools
will not do. Nor will transparent tools with outputs too complex for a
human to trace.13
Although the Contraband Detector, as imagined, exceeds
current technology, the trend it reflects-the blossoming of data-driven
prediction tools in the criminal justice system-is hardly science fiction.
In many jurisdictions, judges have already begun to rely heavily on
prediction tools that predict the likelihood of flight or recidivism for bail
and sentencing purposes,14 a practice recently upheld by the Wisconsin
See, e.g., Ferguson, supra note 7, at 331-32 (arguing that reasonable suspicion, construed in terms
of probability, is a "small data doctrine," which "may become practically irrelevant in an era of big
data policing"); Erica Goldberg, Getting Beyond Intuition in the Probable Cause Inquiry, 17 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REV. 789, 791 (2013) (arguing that probable cause can-and should-be cast in
quantitative, probabilistic terms, at least in the "[growing] subset of cases ... where the police rely
on machines or tools . . . to create their suspicion"); Craig S. Lerner, The Reasonableness of
Probable Cause, 81 TEX. L. REV. 951, 994-95 (2003) (suggesting that scholars share an
"impression" that probable cause is "amenable to mathematical form"); Max Minzner, Putting
Probability Back into Probable Cause, 87 TEX. L. REV. 913, 915-16 (2009) (arguing for use of
statistical measures like success rates in the probable cause analysis); Andrew E. Taslitz,
Foreword: The Death of Probable Cause, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2010, at i, ii (2010)
(arguing that "[a]lthough it is hard to describe standards of proof like that embodied in the phrase
'probable cause' in purely mathematical terms, judges and scholars have long [sought] rough
mathematical approximations of the standard"); id. at ii nn.4-7 (compiling sources).
11. See, e.g., HUBERT L. DREYFUS, WHAT COMPUTERS STILL CAN'T Do: A CRITIQUE OF
ARTIFICIAL REASON (1992) (critiquing artificial intelligence); JOSEPH WEIZENBAUM, COMPUTER
POWER AND HUMAN REASON: FROM JUDGMENT TO CALCULATION (1976) (discussing problems with
computers as a substitute for human knowledge). For an overview of contemporary debates focused
on a similar issue-the question of whether to keep humans "in the loop," in the context of
automated warfare-see Rebecca Crootof, A Meaningful Floor for "Meaningful Human Control,"
30 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 53, 54 (2016) (discussing whether "meaningful human control"
requires human decisionmaking to occur "in the loop," "on the loop," or "off the loop"); Markus
Wagner, Taking Humans Out of the Loop: Implications for International Humanitarian Law, 21
J.L. INFO. & SCI. 155, 159-60 & nn.19-22 (2011) (discussing humanitarian law and "the
[considerable] requirements for autonomous weapon systems").
12. See infra Section II.B.
13. See generally FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK Box SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT
CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015) (discussing the impact of big data). The issue of what,
precisely, it means for algorithmic outputs to be traceable is an immensely complicated one, which
I largely reserve for future work. For background, see Jenna Burrell, How the Machine "Thinks"
Understanding Opacity in Machine Learning Algorithms, 3 BIG DATA & SOC'Y 1, 1 (2016)
(discussing the problem of opacity for machine learning algorithms).
14. See Julia Angwin, Jeff Larson, Surya Mattu & Lauren Kirchner, Machine Bias,
PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-
in-criminal-sentencing [https://perma.cc/76FL-XVUN] (exploring how data-driven prediction tools
are currently being used at the sentencing stage); Vivian Ho, Seeking A Better Bail System, SF
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Supreme Court.1 5 Likewise, the first wave of suspicion tools have
recently been adopted by police departments, often to help officers
assess individuals' "threat scores" while on patrol.16 At present, the
technology is crude; no hyper-precise detection tool, able to predict the
presence of contraband eighty percent of the time, yet exists. But this
will not be true for long. The next generation of "threat score" tools may
well resemble the Contraband Detector. The one after that may surpass
it.
This impending reality prompts an important set of questions.
As I show in Part II, the Supreme Court has long understood probable
cause (as well as its sibling requirement, reasonable suspicion) in
explanatory terms. Existing case law focuses on whether police have
articulated-or could have articulated-a convincing theory of
wrongdoing. If machines become capable of predicting criminal activity
more acutely than judges and police officers, however, of what use are
intelligible theories? If explanations no longer facilitate statistical
accuracy-if, indeed, they stand to impede statistical accuracy-why
should we continue to insist on them?1 7
In recent years, there has been no shortage of commentary
calling for greater regulation of the often-opaque, often-proprietary
algorithms that increasingly shape our fates. But commentary has
focused mostly on the risk of error-algorithmic inaccuracy-as its
normative motivation. Algorithms are cause for concern, the argument
goes, insofar as they make mistakes, and the reason algorithms must
be accountable to human understanding (the argument continues) is to
avoid those mistakes. This logic is discernible in both scholarship on
Fourth Amendment law specifically and scholarship on due process writ
large.1 8 But as algorithms improve, this logic wears thin. Indeed, it
Turns to Computer Algorithm, S.F. CHRON. (Aug. 1, 2016), http://www.sfchronicle.com/crime/
article/Seeking-a-better-bail-system-SF-turns-to-8899654.php [https://perma.cc/QXM8-8ZKR].
15. See State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016).
16. See, e.g., Justin Jouvenal, The New Way Police Are Surveilling You: Calculating Your
Threat 'Score,' WASH. POST (Jan. 10, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/
the-new-way-police-are-surveilling-you-calculating-your-threat-score/2016/01/10/e42bcac-8e15-
11e5-baf4-bdf37355da0c_story.html?utm term=.c765ff7bcfO9 [https://perma.cc/HFY5-U47E].
17. Policing is not the only realm in which machine learning brings normative controversy to
the surface. In the employment discrimination setting, machine learning is upending the
foundations of the "disparate impact" doctrine. See, e.g., Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big
Data's Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671 (2016). And machine learning is also forcing us to
decide what inputs are appropriate for making sensitive distributive decisions. See, e.g., Rick
Swedloff, Risk Classification's Big Data (R)evolution, 21 CONN. INS. L.J. 339 (2015) (exploring this
problem in the insurance context).
18. On the Fourth Amendment side, see Kerr, supra note 3, at 137-38 (arguing that suspicion
decisions are best left to "instinct" and "intuition," because judges are skilled at "get[ting] a
feeling," in context, that something is amiss about a given claim of suspicion-e.g., that law
enforcement is omitting relevant information-or, likewise, that additional evidence is necessary
2017] 1255
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becomes self-defeating. If statistical accuracy is ultimately what
matters, it may soon be humans that require oversight by machines, not
the other way around.
In this Article, I will argue-using probable cause as the case
study-that explanatory standards vindicate goals apart from accuracy
by enabling judges, as supervisors of state power, to navigate value-
pluralism. In the Fourth Amendment context and elsewhere, requiring
state actors to explain their decisions enables judges (1) to consider the
plurality of values implicated by the exercise of state power and (2) to
resolve conflicts between those values in a context-sensitive way. At
day's end, the rationale for individualized review, costly and inefficient
as it may be, is that in some settings we cannot be sure in advance which
values will be implicated by the exercise of power. And when that is true,
decisionmaking resists automation. Decisions must be subject-or at
least susceptible-to case-by-case evaluation in order to ensure that no
particular value or set of values subsumes others. Naturally, to say that
we entrust judges with this task does not mean other mechanisms of
governance are irrelevant; on the contrary, administrative regulation
and democratic oversight (often intertwined) also have an important
to clear the evidentiary hurdle); and Rich, supra note 6, at 897-901 (arguing that humans can
"always at least potentially ... includ[e] a new piece of relevant information in an analysis," and
that this makes them better at performing suspicion decisions, since an algorithm, due to its
necessarily limited training, "cannot consider the 'whole picture' regarding a person's potential
criminality as required by the Fourth Amendment"). On the due process side, see PASQUALE, supra
note 13, at 18 (summarizing the book's normative ambition by warning that without robust
oversight for algorithms, "[flaulty data, invalid assumptions, and defective models"-in other
words, inaccuracy-will reign supreme); Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85
WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 1256-57 (2008) (enumerating algorithmic governance tools that have been
prone to error, including (1) "[b]enefit [m]anagement [s]ystems" that have issued "hundreds of
thousands of incorrect Medicaid, food stamp, and welfare eligibility determinations," (2)
algorithms meant o locate " 'dead-beat' parents who owe child support" that sweep in many non-
offenders, triggering automatic garnishment of wages, and (3) counterterrorism tools that, due to
"[u]nsophisticated algorithms and faulty data," end up "generat[ing] high rates of false positives"
with grave law enforcement consequences); and Kate Crawford & Jason Schulz, Big Data and Due
Process: Toward A Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 119 (2014)
(explaining that "[flor Big Data to deliver the answers we seek, it must be accurate and include all
appropriate inputs equally to overcome any signal problems"). The core principle here-that the
main goal of procedural protections is to reduce error-is nothing new. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254, 267 (1970), arguably the high-water mark of constitutional procedure, described pre-
termination hearings for welfare recipients (which the Court ultimately held to be necessary under
the Due Process Clause), as serving "one function only: to produce an initial determination of the
validity of the welfare department's grounds for discontinuance of payments in order to protect a
recipient against an erroneous termination of his benefits." Furthermore, among scholars, the
focus on accuracy reaches back to Larry Tribe's famous meditation on statistical analysis in law,
which spawned an entire genre of scholarship in the 1980s and 1990s about the virtues and
shortcomings of making legal proof more "precise" via mathematics. See Tribe, supra note 6. Tribe's
analysis focused primarily on accuracy. He worried, for example, that incorporating mathematical
formulas into jury deliberations would cause human decisionmakers to "ask[] the wrong
questions," to unduly discount the value of "soft variables," and to give short shrift to
"mathematical prior[s]." Id. at 1359, 1361, 1365.
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role to play in managing value-pluralism.19 Indeed, as I explain in Part
IV, explanatory standards are often important, quite apart from
facilitating case-specific review, for the information they yield. In areas
like policing, where enforcement priorities are often opaque to public
view, explanatory standards are a window into practices on the ground.
Specifically, I identify two sets of values that trade off, in some
cases, against statistical accuracy and that judges should have an
opportunity to consider as they supervise the police. The first are values
enshrined in specific constitutional prohibitions. Selecting law
enforcement targets on the basis of race or religion, for example, raises
Equal Protection and First Amendment values quite independent of the
statistical accuracy of the decisions. In other words, even if race or
religion (perhaps combined with other data) turned out to be a powerful
proxy for criminal activity, the use of these variables would be
disquieting, and more exacting scrutiny would be appropriate.
Likewise, if associational data .g., membership in a political
organization-were the main basis of suspicion, First Amendment
values would counsel in favor of caution.
The second set of values that trade off against accuracy consist
of "legality" principles, which often find doctrinal anchor in the Due
Process Clause. I focus in particular on the prohibition against
vagueness and the notion of "fair notice" in criminal law, which entail
that seemingly lawful conduct should be presumed lawful-in-fact,
unless the state can convincingly suggest otherwise. I call this the
"6other side of the story" principle: to justify intrusion, law enforcement's
theory of wrongdoing must be capable of dislodging the most plausible
innocent version of events on the other side-the version a suspect
herself might offer, if the proceeding was adversarial. In keeping with
the Supreme Court's vagueness jurisprudence, this requirement serves
two goals at once. First, it allows people to predict, to some extent at
least, what types of conduct invite intrusion. Second, and more
crucially, it " [dis]courage [s] arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement
[of the law]."20 This last point is especially important, because it
highlights the "disciplining" role of explanatory standards. When
officials know they will have to account for their decisions, that
knowledge, by itself, has a salutary effect on official psychology and
behavior. Long before judicial scrutiny actually occurs, in other words,
the benefits of explanation-giving accrue upstream: it causes officials to
monitor themselves and-ideally-to internalize the constitutional
limits and legality principles just explored.
19. See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
20. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).
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Navigating the tension between these values is a critical aspect
of judicial review-indeed, of all governance-and more importantly, as
I suggest in Part V, it is the aspect of judicial review least amenable to
automation. This does not mean that all suspicion decisions implicate
all of the non-accuracy values just discussed. Many, in fact, implicate
none of them. In the great run of cases, suspicion decisions are based
on theories of wrongdoing that rely on no sensitive variables, and that
readily comport with rule-of-law principles. In those cases, it is
conceivable that, in theory, automation would be appropriate. The
problem is that not all cases are this way. At times, values beyond
accuracy become relevant, and the resulting pluralism is not one that
we can trust machines-bound as they are by the formal limits of their
training-to navigate. Case-based oversight is needed. And for that,
explanations are indispensable.
One final note before jumping in. Although my doctrinal prism
here is Fourth Amendment suspicion, the normative question is not so
limited. After laying out the explanatory model of probable cause in
Parts I, II, and III, I endeavor in Parts IV and V to develop a more
general argument about explanatory standards and judicial review in
the age of powerful machines. Ultimately, to demand that state officials
explain their decisions is to make a simple, but profound, claim about
the legitimate exercise of state power. The question is whether that
claim can be reduced to statistical outcomes. In many contexts-
certainly in the policing context-the answer is no.
I. PROBABILITY V. PLAUSIBILITY, PREDICTION V. EXPLANATION
Probability and plausibility are different metrics for assessing
the strength of an inference drawn from observed facts. Probability is
about predictive likelihood. Past observations can be extrapolated to
new data: based on "the general frequencies of events,"21 we can predict
the odds that a particular inference is true.22 This certainly happened
before the rise of big data; we do it all the time in everyday life. But
machine learning has intensified the process. Today, prediction is more
powerful-and possible in more domains-than ever before.23
Plausibility, by contrast, is about explanatory power.24 All
21. Allen & Stein, supra note 9, at 560.
22. For background on conditional probability-and Bayesian reasoning writ large-see
Maggie Wittlin, Hindsight Evidence, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1334-41 (2016).
23. See, e.g., PASQUALE, supra note 13.
24. This conception of plausibility, as distinct from probability, has surfaced previously in
two other areas. The first is pleading doctrine. See Brennan-Marquez, supra note 9, at 191 (arguing
that plausibility analysis, per Iqbal and Twombly, is not a less exacting species of probability, but
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observed facts invite many possible inferences as to what brought the
facts about. For Inference A to be plausible, it must provide an
explanation of observed facts that meshes with an observer's
understanding of the world.25 Moreover, whether Inference A is more
plausible than Inference B (or vice versa) depends on which inference
supplies the better explanation: which inference is simpler, consistent
with a greater share of facts, and more compatible with "background
beliefs."26 Inference A is relatively plausible if, in comparison to other
an epistemologically distinct question of whether the "hypothesis of illegal behavior"-as stated in
the complaint-is superior, in an explanatory sense, to "readily imaginable hypothesis of legal
behavior" that are also consistent with alleged facts); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 557, 567 (2007) (glossing the plausibility standard by explaining that the alleged facts must
"plausibly suggest[ I" wrongdoing, "not merely [be] consistent with" wrongdoing, since the latter
could admit of an "obvious alternative [legal] explanation" (emphasis added)); A. Benjamin
Spencer, Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1, 6, 15 (2009) (explaining that
complaints fail to allege plausible entitlements to relief if "lawful reasons could explain factual
occurrences reported in a complaint just as well as unlawful ones might"). For an interesting
judicial take on the relationship between Fourth Amendment suspicion standards and pleading
doctrine, see Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 336 (2007) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the PLSRA's heightened pleading requirements should be construed as
akin to "probable cause"). The second is commentary on the epistemology of guilt determinations.
See, e.g., Pardo, supra note 9; Pardo & Allen, supra note 9; see also Nancy Pennington & Reid
Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: The Story Model, 13 CARDOZo L. REV. 519
(1991). For defenses of the probability view, see LARRY LAUDAN, TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL
LAW (2006); and Daniel Shaviro, Statistical-Probability Evidence and the Appearance of Justice,
103 HARv. L. REV. 530 (1989). For an overview of the tension, see Edward K. Cheng,
Reconceptualizing the Burden of Proof, 122 YALE L.J. 1254, 1256-59 (2013).
25. See, e.g., Brennan-Marquez, supra note 9, at 172 nn.17-20 and accompanying text
(explaining that plausibility determinations depend on evaluating competing inferences against
the backdrop of "what is natural" and what is not). The understanding of plausibility has much in
common with the idea of "causative probability," developed most systematically by Alex Stein. See
Alex Stein, The Flawed Probabilistic Foundation of Law and Economics, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. 199,
204-07 (2011) (explaining that causative probability concerns the analysis of likelihood within
"individuated causal scenarios," as opposed to likelihood across an entire universe of cases, as
mathematical probability would emphasize). It also overlaps in large measure with the concept of
"truth-sensitivity," pioneered by Timothy Williamson and recently adapted by David Enoch and
Talia Fisher. See TIMOTHY WILLIAMSON, KNOWLEDGE AND ITS LIMITS (2000); David Enoch & Talia
Fisher, Sense and Sensitivity: Epistemic and Instrumental Approaches to Statistical Evidence, 67
STAN. L. REV. 557 (2015); see also Alex Stein, The New Doctrinalism: Implications for Evidence
Theory, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 2085, 2092 n.35 (2015) [hereinafter Stein, The New Doctrinalism]
(providing useful background on the concept). According to Professor Williamson, there is a
difference between justifications that are accurate in particular cases for case-specific reasons and
justifications that tend to be accurate across cases but only happen to be accurate in particular
cases. In other words, a justification is "truth-sensitive" if it focuses on variables that tend, in
context, to track truth, as opposed to variables that correlate to truth without tracking it. See
Enoch & Fisher, supra, at 573-77. For excellent general background on these themes, see L.
JONATHAN COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE (1977).
26. See, e.g., Pardo & Allen, supra note 9, at 230 (enumerating these and other conditions of
relative plausibility); Peter Thagard, The Best Explanation: Criteria for Theory Choice, 75 J. PHIL.
76 (1978) (famously offering "consilience"-the ability of an explanation to account for disparate
facts-"simplicity, and analogy" as criteria that define the quality of explanations); see also Stein,
The New Doctrinalism, supra note 25, at 2091 (listing "coherence, consilience, causality, and
evidential support" as the variables that drive "relative plausibility" analysis).
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inferences, it is worth entertaining.27
At a functional level, probability and plausibility often overlap.
If Fact X rarely corresponds (in a probabilistic sense) with Explanation
A, the explanation is unlikely to be worth entertaining. Likewise, the
inverse: if Fact X often corresponds to Explanation A, the explanation
will tend, in practice, to be superior to others.
But the two properties are analytically independent, and in two
situations they pull apart. The first are cases that involve unlikely but
tailored explanations. For example, suppose that Evan, an otherwise-
healthy eighteen-year-old, starts experiencing heart palpitations-so
he starts Googling and comes across a number of possible explanations,
including Marfan's Syndrome, a rare tissue disorder. What catches his
eye about Marfan's is that it corresponds to long, thin limbs, and Evan
is considerably lankier than either of his parents.
In this example, the proposition that Evan has Marfan's is
relatively plausible, in that it provides a holistic account of observed
facts that do not readily admit of another explanation; many of us, for
example, would think that Evan has good grounds to call the doctor.28
27. See, e.g., Pardo & Allen, supra note 9, at 229 nn.16-17 (compiling sources on the issue of
what makes some explanations superior to others); see also David Schum, Species of Abductive
Reasoning in Fact Investigation in Law, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 1645, 1659-60 (2001) (exploring the
epistemic mechanics of selecting among competing explanations, which, following Umberto Eco,
he refers to as "undercoded abduction"); W. Bradley Wendel, Explanation in Legal Scholarship:
The Inferential Structure of Doctrinal Analysis, 96 CORNELLL. REV. 1035, 1049-55 (2011) (arguing
that inferences to the best explanation are inherently "contrastive" and enumerating criteria of
comparison). As a conceptual matter, it is also possible to express the comparative aspect of
plausibility analysis in statistical terms-in other words, to model the question of comparative
likelihood quantitatively rather than qualitatively. Ed Cheng, for example, has developed a useful
model of "comparative probability," designed to capture the upside of both the probabilistic view
and the explanatory view simultaneously. According to Cheng, the comparison between competing
explanations-the question of which explanation is "best"-can be expressed numerically by
dividing the condition probability of one hypothesis, given known facts, by the probability of
another hypothesis, given the same facts, and asking if the resulting fraction is greater than one
(in which the hypothesis in the numerator is comparatively more likely), less than one (in which
the hypothesis in the denominator is comparatively more likely), or one (in which case the two
hypotheses are equally likely). See Cheng, supra note 24. I highly recommend Cheng's model. It
seems like the most plausible-perhaps even the most probable!-numerical gloss on traditional
explanatory standards.
28. Two caveats bear noting. First, one can certainly disagree with the idea that Marfan's is
a relatively plausible explanation of observed facts; to some readers, for example, it might seem
more plausible that Evan is a hypochondriac. Even so, relative plausibility, not predictive
likelihood, would be the relevant terrain of dispute. Second, to say that Marfan's is relatively
plausible now, given the limited information Evan knows, is to say nothing about whether, once
more information surfaces, it will remain relatively plausible. The point is it clears that hurdle for
the time being, despite its low probability overall.
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But the proposition is still quite improbable.29 Marfan's is rare.30
Regardless of the fit between the observed facts and his provisional
diagnosis, the likelihood that Evan actually has the disorder-if he had
to make a wager on the proposition, say, with no further information-
is small. But the inference still seems worth entertaining in context.
The second situation in which probability and plausibility
diverge is the mirror-image of the first: cases that involve likely but
untailored predictions. Untailored predictions come in two forms. For
one thing, a prediction can be untailored because the interaction of
input-variables is either opaque or too complex to trace, making it
impossible to know what generated the prediction-so impossible, a
fortiori, to know how the prediction relates to a given case. The
Contraband Detector hypothetical is an example. Because officers
cannot be sure which variables contribute to a "hit,"31 they have no way
of knowing, and thus no way of explaining to a judge, how the prediction
maps on to any particular residence.
For another thing, a prediction can be untailored because its
input-variables, though known, are too threadbare to permit
meaningful evaluation of how well or poorly the prediction tracks a
particular set of observed facts.32 Imagine, for example, that a database
tracking the relationship between electricity usage and drug
manufacturing has uncovered that elevated usage patterns-say, ten
times the average amount-has correlated eighty percent of the time,
in the past, with drug manufacturing. Furthermore, suppose there is
reason to think that drug manufacturers will be unable to avoid
outsized electricity usage, so we have good grounds to believe the eighty
29. Suppose, for example, that one of Evan's friends responds by saying: "Wow-do you really
think you have Marfan's?" If Evan is well-informed about the disease (and feeling level-headed),
we would expect him to say something like: "I mean, no-probably not. It is a really rare disease.
But I am worried, because I definitely have some of the symptoms." Indeed, if Evan were to respond
more resolutely-"Yes, I am almost certain I have Marfan's! What am I going to do?"-he might
be accused of sensationalism, or hypochondria. Given Evan's limited knowledge, there is simply
no basis to conclude that he "almost certainly" has Marfan's, or even that he likely has Marfan's.
30. Daniel P. Judge & Harry C. Dietz, Marfan's Syndrome, 366 LANCET 1965, 1965 (2005)
(noting that "[t]he incidence of classic Marfan's syndrome is about 2-3 per 10,000 individuals").
31. In practice, the potential reasons for this are numerous. Some are innocuous-such as
lack of technical training on the officers' part-while others are more troubling. In many settings,
for example, algorithms are untraceable because they are proprietary. See generally PASQUALE,
supra note 13 (exploring the concept of "big data" and the hidden algorithms associated with it).
32. See Pardo & Allen, supra note 9, at 229-30 (explaining that relative plausibility analysis
involves two distinct steps-first, "generating potential explanations of the evidence," and second,
"choosing among potential explanations"). All three types of opacity raise concerns, in Enoch and
Fisher's terms, about "truth-sensitivity." See Enoch & Fisher, supra note 25 (arguing for a
redirection of the statistical evidence debate as to include the concept of sensitivity). The third
type of opacity also raises concerns about what Luke Meier has described as epistemic "confidence."
See infra note 42 and accompanying text.
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percent figure is predictive moving forward. On these facts, would the
observation that a given residence uses ten times the average amount
of electricity be sufficient, by itself, to warrant a search? As in the
Contraband Detector case, the answer is no, but the reason is slightly
different. Here, the problem is not that the explanatory theory behind
the prediction is unknown. On the contrary, the theory of wrongdoing-
that drug manufacturing led to high electricity usage-is plain, and
certainly plausible. The problem is that heightened electricity usage
has many innocuous explanations.33 From the fact of heightened usage
alone, it is impossible to assess the relative plausibility of criminality
in any given case by comparison to innocent explanations.34
Along these lines, consider an example of the Supreme Court's
own fashioning: Ybarra v. Illinois.35 Based on evidence that a local
tavern owner was dealing heroin, the police secured a warrant to search
the business. When they arrived at the tavern in the late afternoon,
there were a small number of customers in the tavern (between nine
and thirteen, the record was unclear), and the police proceeded to pat
down all of them-including Ventura Ybarra, who was playing pinball.
The pat-down yielded a cigarette pack, which, when opened by the
searching officer, turned out to contain six tin foil packets of heroin.3 6
Ybarra moved to suppress the heroin as fruit of an illegal search. He
argued that his presence in the tavern, without more, failed to generate
probable cause.
Although the state court upheld Ybarra's conviction-because
the search had occurred "in a one-room bar where it [was] obvious from
the complaint . .. that heroin was being sold or dispensed"37-the
33. Perhaps the occupant is a chef, who often practices her craft. Perhaps she is a computer
enthusiast, operating a makeshift server out of her home. See JOSH FAIRFIELD, ESCAPE: PROPERTY,
PRIVACY, AND THE INTERNET OF THINGS (forthcoming 2017) (book manuscript on file with author)
(discussing an anecdote in which a friend of the author had his home raided, on suspicion of drug
manufacturing, because he was running a makeshift server). Perhaps she is simply traveling for
a few months and accidentally left her high-definition television on. Without more facts, it is
impossible to meaningfully assess the relative plausibility of these (and other) innocent
explanations by comparison to wrongdoing.
34. Naturally, it may well be a different situation if no other explanation came to mind-if
the incriminating fact were, say, data about the purchase of a large stock of a particular chemical
that has no (known) residential uses. That would make the inference more like an inference of
wrongdoing from dog sniffs or radar guns: tools whose outputs typically admit of no plausible
explanation (even putting the question of relative plausibility to one side) apart from wrongdoing.
35. 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
36. I am putting to one side the question of whether opening the cigarette carton qualified as
a search. See Chadwick v. United States, 433 U.S. 1 (1977) (holding that a warrant was required
before law enforcement could open a closed piece of luggage located during an otherwise lawful
search of an impounded car). The Ybarra Court assumed for the sake of its analysis that opening
the cigarette carton was not an independent Fourth Amendment problem. I will assume the same.
37. People v. Ybarra, 373 N.E.2d 1013, 1016 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978), rev'd sub om. Ybarra v.
Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
1262 [Vol. 70:4:1249
2017] PLAUSIBLE CAUSE 1263
Supreme Court reversed, denouncing the government's "guilt by
association" theory of Fourth Amendment suspicion. As the Court put
it:
Upon entering the tavern, the police did not recognize Ybarra and had no reason to believe
that he had committed, was committing, or was about to commit any offense under state
or federal law. Ybarra made no gestures indicative of criminal conduct, made no
movements that might suggest an attempt to conceal contraband, and said nothing of a
suspicious nature to the police officers. In short, the agents knew nothing in particular
about Ybarra, except that he was present, along with several other customers, in a public
tavern at a time when the police had reason to believe that the bartender would have
heroin for sale.3 8
According to the Court, this was not enough to justify the search of
Ybarra; someone's "mere propinquity to others independently suspected
of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause
to search that person."39 Rather, "probable cause [must be]
particularized . .. to [each] person," a standard that can never be
satisfied by "pointing to the fact that coincidentally there exists
probable cause to search . . . another or to search the premises where
the person may happen to be."40
There are two ways to read Ybarra.41 First, the Court may have
been concerned about whether the officers' inference of wrongdoing was
accurate. It may have been skeptical that someone's presence in the
tavern at that particular time of day actually predicted criminal
activity, regardless of the officers' hunches to that effect. Second, the
Court may have thought the inference troubling regardless of accuracy.
It may have found the associational claim of wrongdoing insufficient
because of the type of inference on which it rested, no matter its
predictive power.
I find the latter reading more convincing. It seems implausible
that Ybarra would have come out differently if, holding everything else
equal, the police had been able to point to evidence-a study, say, or
38. Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 90-91.
39. Id. at 91.
40. Id.; see also Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 62 (1968) (holding that police had no
probable cause to arrest a man they "merely saw ... talking to a number of known narcotics
addicts over a period of eight hours," because the police were "completely ignorant regarding the
content of [the] conversations," and "[t]he inference that persons who talk to narcotics addicts are
engaged in the criminal traffic in narcotics is simply not the sort of reasonable inference required
to support an intrusion by the police upon an individual's personal security"); United States v. Di
Re, 332 U.S. 581, 583-87 (1948) (holding it unlawful for officers to search all three passengers of
car that was suspected of carrying contraband, when an informant's tip had only designated the
driver-not the passengers-as likely to be involved in wrongdoing); cf. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S.
266, 274 (2000) (holding that law enforcement may not stop and frisk a suspect based solely on an
anonymous tip describing the suspect's clothing and whereabouts).
41. This ambiguity is not necessarily a drawback. It may be that the Court was skeptical on
both fronts-leading it to analyze the question holistically.
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historical arrest records-establishing that people who pass their
weekday afternoons in this specific tavern are fifty-one percent likely to
be connected to drug activity. The reason is simple: evidence of a
statistical link between being in this particular tavern and criminal
activity would have made it more probable that each frisk would yield
evidence of wrongdoing, but it would not have made that result more
plausible. The latter question depends on the evaluation of other
explanations for a person's presence in the tavern. And this, in turn,
depends on access to information that gives rise to other explanations
for one's presence in the tavern,42 which is precisely what the officers in
Ybarra lacked.43 In other words, the theory of wrongdoing in Ybarra,
though perfectly comprehensible, was untailored-so even if, in a
statistical sense, the theory was likely, it failed to carry the burden of
relative plausibility.
42. In epistemic terms, this property can be described as "confidence"-that is, the confidence
that an observer has in the veracity of her impression of likelihood, as distinct from the impression
of likelihood itself. Suppose the Yankees are playing the Cardinals in the World Series, and all
Mary knows is that the Yankees are favored (according to reliable experts) nine to one. From this,
Mary would have grounds to conclude that the Yankees are ninety percent likely to win the World
Series. But Mary nonetheless may be circumspect about drawing this conclusion, because she does
not have enough information to confidently pronounce on the matter at hand. In this sense, Luke
Meier refers to "confidence" as "the sufficiency of information from which to make a probability
analysis." Luke Meier, Probability, Confidence, and the "Reasonable Jury" Standard, 84 MIss. L.J.
747, 789 (2015); see also ALEX STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAw 48 (2005) (describing the
same property as "resiliency"); Marjorie Anne McDiarmid, Lawyer Decision Making: The Problem
of Prediction, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 1847, 1878-80 (diagnosing lack of confidence/resilience as the
issue highlighted in L. Jonathan Cohen's famous "gatecrasher" hypothetical). Although Professor
Meier styles his analysis exclusively in terms of probability, the same reasoning comfortably
applies to plausibility as well. The point is that all claims of likelihood, whether probabilistic or
"plausibilistic" in nature, embed a second-order confidence level (as distinct from the first-order
assertion of likelihood) based on the amount and quality of evidence that contributed to the
assertion-and, more important, the amount and quality of evidence left out. Though esoteric-
sounding, the idea is familiar enough to everyday life. Imagine Joe has three friends visiting for
the weekend, and he wants to take them to his favorite restaurant, Rose's. Sadly for Joe, no
reservations are available in the main dining room; the only option is the bar, which is first-come,
first-served. When Joe calls Rose's to ask about the situation at the bar, the host informs him that
it is "usually hard to find seats for more than two." Does the host's observation-assuming it is
reliable-make the proposition that Joe's party of four will get seats at Rose's relatively
implausible? On its own, no-we need more information to evaluate the proposition's relative
strength. Is Joe planning to visit Rose's on a weekend night or a weekday night? (And which one
was the host describing?) Is there reason to think that crowds might be thinner on the particular
night that Joe has in mind? And so on. Of course, these are exactly the questions that we would
expect Joe to ask himself. Relative plausibility analysis-shaped by implicit "confidence"
conditions-is very natural to adult humans.
43. See Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 93-94 (noting that the officers "neither recognized [Ybarra] as a
person with a criminal history nor had any particular reason to believe that he might be inclined
to assault them"); see also Pardo & Allen, supra note 9, at 229 (explaining that plausibilistic
reasoning "occurs in two steps: generating potential explanations of the evidence and then




Ultimately, whether a prediction is untailored because it rests
on a threadbare explanation, as in Ybarra and the electricity usage
example, or because it lacks explanatory power outright, as in the
Contraband Detector hypothetical, the upshot is the same. It is possible
for an inference to be likely, in a probabilistic sense, without being
relatively plausible. The latter depends not only on the predictive power
of an inference, but also on its "quality."44 Specifically, it depends on
whether the factual inputs giving rise to the inference enable an
observer to meaningfully compare different explanations before
deciding which to entertain. This, in turn, depends on the factual inputs
being (1) known, (2) traceable, and (3) rich enough to generate multiple
explanations. If any of these conditions is lacking, no analysis of relative
plausibility can be performed.
II. OUR JURISPRUDENCE OF "PLAUSIBLE CAUSE"
Having explored the formal contours of the probability-
plausibility distinction, we are now in a position to ask which model
better describes existing law. Although the Supreme Court, following
the text of the Constitution, has always used the term "probable cause,"
its reasoning tracks the plausibility model of suspicion. For the last half
century, the Court has called for totality-of-the-circumstances analysis
that focuses on whether law enforcement's theory of wrongdoing
explains observed facts.45 Especially since 1983, when Illinois v. Gates
universalized this approach,4 6 the Court has continually emphasized
that suspicion is a "fluid" concept,4 7 "not readily, or even usefully,
reduced to a neat set of legal rules."48 Because suspicion reflects the
"practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable [people],
44. See Pardo, supra note 9, at 604 ("Under standards of proof higher than a preponderance
of the evidence, the quality of an explanation needed to satisfy the standard rises accordingly.").
For certain theorists, including Professor Pardo, focus on the "quality" of adduced evidence is a
distinct-but epistemologically equivalent-way of saying that law enforcement bears the burden
of proof in this context.
45. See, e.g., Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 (2014).
46. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-31 (1983) (explaining, in the context of an
informant's tip, that the "totality-of-the-circumstances approach is far more consistent with our
prior treatment of probable cause" than any rigid test of reliability-and overturning precedent on
that basis). This framework also applies to claims of reasonable suspicion.
47. Id. at 232.
48. Id.; see also Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1055 (2013) (explaining that when it comes
to assessing probable cause, "[the Court] ha[s] rejected rigid rules, bright-line tests, and
mechanistic inquiries in favor of a more flexible, all-things-considered approach").
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not legal technicians, act,"49 it resists "precise definition or
quantification."50
On their own, these formulations are hardly remarkable. The
law is replete with fact-bound tests that defy "reduc[tion] to a neat set
of ... rules." What is remarkable, however, is how reluctant the Court
has been to assign numerical values to suspicion benchmarks, or to pick
out specific variables for greater weight in the totality-of-the-
circumstances analysis. Of course, this reticence may be pragmatic.5 1 It
is conceivable, for instance, that the Justices worry about numerical
benchmarks-even if accurate-clouding suspicion decisions on the
ground.52 The plausibility view, by contrast, provides a principled
explanation for the Court's reticence. Plausibility is qualitative, not
quantitative. So it only stands to reason that the Court's analysis would
shy away from numbers, in favor of narrative explanations.53
49. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949).
50. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003).
51. Various scholars have argued that judges worry about getting numerical benchmarks
wrong. See, e.g., Lerner, supra note 10, at 995 ("Few courts have summoned the courage, or
foolhardiness, to propose [a specific number] for probable cause."). Judges could also be concerned
that benchmarks-even assuming they are properly calibrated-will tend to inflame cognitive
biases that distort suspicion determinations. See Bambauer, supra note 3, at 482 & nn. 108-113
(outlining biases). Finally, the absence of numbers may reflect an unstated intuition that suspicion
benchmarks, though numerical, are also unstable-shifting, for example, in response to how
intrusive particular investigative tactics are, or the gravity of the crime under investigation. See
Bacigal, supra note 7, at 338-39 (arguing that benchmarks of probable cause, though articulable
numerically, essentially are imprecise-so any specified numbers would be, by definition,
misleading). If so, then numerical benchmarks would become, so to speak, moving targets. And
wariness about explicating them would make sense. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 8, at 37-46
(advocating a "proportionality" approach to probable cause that would impose more or less exacting
requirements, based on context, risk factors, and the like). See generally Kerr, supra note 3, at 132
(hypothesizing that perhaps the Justices are simply "afraid of math").
52. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 10, at 827 (arguing that the "benefits and drawbacks" of
"quantifying probable cause" depend "on the types of evidence used to satisfy probable cause"-in
some settings, on Goldberg's view, quantification stands to improve the status quo, in other
settings, no); see also Colb, supra note 7 (exploring the difficulties that humans often encounter
when trying to relate statistical evidence to particular cases); David L. Faigman, John Monahan
& Chris Slobogin, Group to Individual (G2i) Inference in Scientific Expert Testimony, 81 U. CHI. L.
REV. 417, 421-27 (2014) (same).
53. Putting the dearth of numbers to one side, the plausibility view also explains why the
Court has not picked out specific variables for (presumptively) heightened weight in the suspicion
analysis. If suspicion depended on probability, it would surely be possible to designate certain
variables as "highly probative," on heuristic grounds at least. But if suspicion depends on narrative
explanation, such designations would make little sense, because the connection between a given
variable and the set of possible explanations would depend entirely on context. Predictions offered




A. Explanations, Not Predictions
Beyond the formal consonance between "plausible cause" and
the totality-of-the-circumstances approach to suspicion, the Court's
reasoning in individual cases also underscores its preference for
explanatory, as opposed to predictive, reasoning. In Ybarra v. Illinois,
discussed above,54 the Court held that someone's mere presence in a
tavern whose owner was suspected of drug trafficking did not establish
probable cause to perform a search. In so holding, it emphasized that
"[e]ach patron who walked into [the tavern] was clothed with
constitutional protection against an unreasonable search or an
unreasonable seizure."55 Thus, the officers needed a reason to favor the
inference of wrongdoing "with respect to [each patron],"5 6 not a blanket
reason, like mere presence in the tavern, that applied indiscriminately
to every patron. In other words, the reason for intrusion needed to be
one that provided the officers-and could have provided a judge-with
grounds to believe that wrongdoing was more plausible in the case of
each patron than the best innocent explanation. On this front, Ybarra
was an easy case; the best innocent explanation was obvious. Each
patron might have been in the tavern simply to patronize the tavern.
So plausible cause did not exist.57
Similar reasoning was discernible in Florida v. J.L.,8 a case
about the sufficiency of an anonymous tip to establish reasonable
suspicion for a Terry stop. A tipster called 911 to report that "a young
black male standing at a particular bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt
was carrying a gun."5 9 Officers were dispatched, and, upon arrival, they
saw three people, one of whom-the respondent, J.L.-was donning a
plaid shirt. The officers proceeded to frisk J.L., despite the fact that
"[a]part from the tip, [they] had no reason to suspect any of the
[occupants] of illegal conduct."60 Not only did "officers . . . not see a
firearm" after approaching J.L.; the state conceded that he "made no
threatening or . .. unusual movements."61 The frisk recovered a gun,
which eventually became the basis of a criminal conviction.
54. See supra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
55. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979) (emphasis added).
56. Id.
57. For similar examples, see Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 62 (1968) (noting no cause to
arrest someone merely because he frequented an establishment known to be a hangout for drug
users); and United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 583-87 (1948) (noting no cause to search the
passengers of a car solely because the driver was suspected of carrying contraband).
58. 529 U.S. 266 (2000).





J.L. challenged the frisk, and the Court held it unlawful. The
Court was particularly concerned about the threadbare nature of the
case against J.L. "Unlike a tip from a known informant whose
reputation can be assessed and who can be held responsible if her
allegations turn out to be fabricated," Justice Ginsburg wrote, "an
anonymous tip alone seldom demonstrates the informant's basis of
knowledge or veracity."62 For an anonymous tip to justify a Terry stop,
it must be tested by follow-up "police observation."63
Like Ybarra, J.L. is susceptible to two readings. Is the problem
that anonymous tips tend to be inaccurate? Or is the problem that
regardless of their accuracy-no matter how well or poorly anonymous
tips predict wrongdoing across cases-the police may not infer criminal
activity from evidence that, in any particular case, is as likely to be
unreliable as it is to be reliable? Once again, I favor the latter reading.
It is hard to imagine that J.L. would have come out differently if, for
example, the police had pointed to data showing that anonymous tips
are truthful and accurate (in this specific jurisdiction) sixty percent of
the time. Even if accurate, this additional data would not have
neutralized Justice Ginsburg's concern. Statistics aside, the police still
had no reason to credit the anonymous tip in this case. Without the
benefit of other "indicia of reliability,"64 there was simply no basis to
disfavor the best innocent explanation of events-that the tipster had
lied. So wrongdoing was not relatively plausible.65
Concerns about the plausibility are also discernible in cases
where the Court has blessed intrusions rather than rebuking them.
Take United States v. Sokolow.66 There, DEA agents stopped Andrew
Sokolow after he landed in Honolulu en route from a short trip to
Miami; a search of Sokolow's luggage eventually yielded a large
quantity of cocaine. Sokolow moved to suppress the drugs on the
grounds that the agents lacked reasonable suspicion to perform the
62. Id. at 270 (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990)).
63. Id.; see also White, 496 U.S. at 328-29 (holding that police had reasonable suspicion to
perform a Terry stop on the basis of an anonymous tip, but only after corroborating details of the
tipster's story-thereby enhancing the tip's reliability).
64. J.L., 529 U.S. at 270.
65. Indeed, even when the Court has embraced relatively "thin" claims of reasonable
suspicion, it has explicitly refused to adopt bright-line rules or formulae urged by the government.
See, e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000) (holding, on the facts of the case, that the police
had reasonable suspicion to stop an unknown person who fled in response to their arrival at a
building, but declining to adopt the government's theory that flight equals suspicion).
66. 490 U.S. 1 (1989).
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search. When the DEA agents initially detained Sokolow, they knew
five things: (1) he had travelled from Honolulu to Miami and back-for
a total of more than twenty hours in the air-for a visit of approximately
forty-eight hours; (2) he checked no luggage; (3) he paid for his plane
ticket in cash, using a wad of twenty-dollar bills; (4) the home phone
number Sokolow gave the airline appeared not to be genuine, leading
the agents to believe that he was traveling under an alias; and (5) he
exhibited "nervous behavior" during his trip.67
Did these five facts, taken in tandem, give the DEA agents
reasonable suspicion to detain Sokolow and search his bags? The Court
said yes. But it went to great length to emphasize that its holding was
irreducibly contextual-a reflection of the "whole picture"68-and that
no particular piece of evidence was the animating factor of its analysis.
For instance, the Court acknowledged that "traveling under an alias
[does not necessarily] reflect ongoing criminal activity: for example, a
person who wished to travel to a hospital or clinic for an operation
[might] wish[ ] to conceal that fact."6 9 Similarly, nervous behavior while
flying, the Court opined, is hardly evidence of criminality; one might
simply "be seeking to avoid a confrontation with an angry acquaintance
or with a creditor."70 Indeed, even the more eyebrow-raising factors-
such as the short trip to Miami, or the use of wadded-up cash to
purchase the tickets, both of which the Court found "out of the
ordinary"-were "not by [themselves] proof of any illegal conduct."71
In other words, every individual piece of evidence was "quite
consistent with innocent travel."7 2 The problem was their combination.
Although it was certainly possible to imagine innocent explanations
behind Sokolow's trip, none seemed relatively plausible. Maybe under
different background conditions-if, for example, it had been Super
67. Id. at 3.
68. Id. at 8 (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)).
69. Id.
70. Id. One wonders-in passing-how many people in the history of commercial air travel
have encountered an angry creditor while strolling through the airport.
71. Id. at 8-9. Interestingly, Justice Scalia-at oral argument-begged to differ. He seemed
to find the notion of purchasing airline tickets with twenty dollar bills ipso facto suspicious. See
Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (No. 87-1295):
[GOVERNMENT LAWYER]: [A] lot of people use cash to purchase a ticket on a shuttle
going from New York to Washington, so we're not saying that the simple fact that
someone has paid for a ticket in cash is necessarily indicative of criminal conduct. But
this was a $2,100 purchase . . . [in] $20 bills.
[JUSTICE SCALIA]: Are you sure that that alone wouldn't be enough? I mean that's rather
extraordinarily [sic], isn't it, just handing over to somebody [multiple thousands of
dollars] of $20 bills?
72. Soholow, 490 U.S. at 9.
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Bowl weekend in Miami during Sokolow's visit 73-the innocent
explanation might have prevailed: the inference -of wrongdoing might
have been relatively implausible in light of an "apparent explanation"
to the contrary.74 But under the facts presented, not so; it was plausible,
the Court thought, to infer that Sokolow was trafficking drugs.75
Not everyone agreed. In dissent, Justice Marshall maintained
that "[t]he . . . circumstantial facts known about Sokolow . .. [were]
scarcely indicative of criminal activity,"76 a point he made by cycling
through those facts one by one:
[T]hat Sokolow took a brief trip to a resort city for which he brought only carry-on luggage
... describes a very large category of presumably innocent travelers. That Sokolow
embarked from Miami, "a source city for illicit drugs," is no more suggestive of illegality;
thousands of innocent persons travel from "source cities" every day and, judging from the
DEA's testimony in past cases, nearly every major city in the country may be
characterized as a source or distribution city. That Sokolow had his phone listed in
another person's name also does not support the majority's assertion that the DEA agents
reasonably believed Sokolow was using an alias; it is commonplace to have one's phone
registered in the name of a roommate, which, it later turned out, was precisely what
Sokolow had done.... Finally, that Sokolow paid for his tickets in cash indicates no
imminent or ongoing criminal activity. The majority "feel[s] confident" that "[m]ost
business travelers . . . purchase airline tickets by credit card or check." Why the majority
confines its focus only to "business travelers" I do not know, but I would not so lightly
infer ongoing crime from the use of legal tender.7 7
Individually, each of these points is forceful and well taken. At some
level, however, Justice Marshall's approach to the question is
unresponsive to the majority's "plausibilistic" reasoning. The point is
not that any specific piece of evidence was especially probative of
criminal activity, or even that all the evidence, taken in tandem, was
especially probative of criminal activity. To make the latter claim, the
majority would have had to analyze the overall likelihood of
wrongdoing, which, apart from being difficult, is simply not what its
opinion focused on. Instead, the opinion was focused on a slightly
different question, one that arguments like Justice Marshall's, even if
sound, would be unlikely to undercut: whether "drug trafficking" was a
73. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 71, at 7:
[JUSTICE STEVENS]: May I ask ... [what] if on Super Bowl weekend someone flew from
Honolulu to Miami and back, and they, they had a pretty obvious explanation for a
three-day trip[?]
[GOVERNMENT LAWYER]: Yes, if, if there was .. . [But] there was in this case no sort of
obvious, apparent explanation.
74. Id.
75. Id.; see also United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002) (holding that border patrol officer
had reasonable suspicion to perform a traffic stop-and rebuking the Ninth Circuit for writing off
certain facts as "irrelevant" to the totality of circumstances analysis).
76. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 15 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 15-16 (internal citations, quotation marks, and alterations omitted).
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plausible narrative to entertain, given the limited universe of known
facts. And the answer, according to the majority, was yes.78
In a similar vein, consider Pringle v. Maryland.79 At 3:00 a.m. on
a Saturday night, law enforcement pulled over a car with three
occupants: a driver, a front-seat passenger, and a back-seat passenger.
The driver consented to a search of the car, which yielded a small bag
of crack, divided up into individual baggies, and approximately $700 in
small bills. When the officers asked whom the drugs belonged to, all
occupants demurred. So the officers arrested all three. Eventually, the
front-seat passenger, Joseph Pringle, was charged with possession with
intent to distribute. Challenging the initial arrest, Pringle argued that
the officers had no grounds to arrest anyone in the car, because, without
more information, it was thirty-three percent likely that the drugs
belonged to any given occupant-not enough for probable cause.80
The Court rejected Pringle's argument, holding that it was
reasonable for the officers to hypothesize that all three suspects were
drug dealers, engaged in a common enterprise.81 As in Sokolow,
however, the Court gave no indication that any one detail, or
constellation of details, had tipped the scales. On the contrary, it made
clear that its conclusion was based on a holistic review of the facts.82
Also as in Sokolow, the strategy on the other side-as articulated by
Pringle's lawyer, since there was no dissenting opinion-was to explain
away each individual fact as plausibly the result of innocent behavior.
For example, when asked by an incredulous Justice Souter if she
typically carried around hundreds of dollars in small bills, the lawyer
78. To be clear, I am not trying to suggest that Sokolow is an obvious or uncontroversial case.
It may be that the majority was wrong about the relative plausibility of drug trafficking, by
contrast to innocent explanations of the observed facts. The point is simply that that question-
what is a relatively plausible explanation of the observed facts, as they fit together?-is precisely
what, under a plausible cause standard, we would expect judges and litigants to debate. In fact,
this is undoubtedly why Sokolow's lawyer focused, during argument, on generating countervailing
explanations of all observed facts-for example, that Sokolow was on a gambling trip, or that he
didn't own a credit card and was attending a funeral. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note
71, at 10.
79. 540 U.S. 366 (2003).
80. For further background, see id. at 367-69. Pringle also argued that if the Court felt
compelled to come up with a bright-line rule, it should make the default that drivers, but not
passengers, may be arrested under circumstances of ambiguous possession-in light of the greater
degree of control that drivers presumptively exercise over the car.
81. By so resolving the case, the Court was able to skate by the considerably more difficult
question of how to analyze a truly one-third, one-third, one-third situation. See Colb, supra note 7,
at 75 (exploring the latter).
82. See, e.g., Pringle, 540 U.S. at 372 n.2 (noting-contra the lower court-that the presence
of money in the car should not be "consider[ed] ... in isolation," but rather, as a "factor in the
totality of circumstances [analysis]").
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replied that yes, she did, and so do many other law-abiding citizens.83
Likewise, when asked about the late hour, Pringle's lawyer suggested
that people in their early twenties are often out late on weekend
nights-nothing strange about that.84 After a few minutes of similar
back-and-forth, Justice Breyer interrupted her, in an illuminating burst
of frustration:
I just think that-look, it just doesn't strike me as plausible that when you have three
people in a car, one of them would stuff some drugs behind an armrest where they're very
easy to find, unless he thought the other two were in on it, I mean, unless you thought
the other two at least didn't care, and if they didn't care they're out there transporting the
drugs with them. . . . So [Pause.] .. . I don't even know, I mean, what I'm struggling for
is, that seems like a reasonable inference so how-how do I know, I mean, I'm making
this kind of inference. How do I know [if] I should or not?8 5
Just as in Sokolow, the trouble with Pringle's point-by-point
rejoinder was that the Court was not focused on the probative value of
particular facts. It was focused on developing an explanatory account of
all the facts.86 On that front, the Court's impression was clear: it seemed
plausible, in context, that all three men were involved in a joint criminal
enterprise.87 Whether the Court was right to find that explanation
plausible can, of course, be debated. But the question would be how
convincing the explanation was in light of all observed facts, not
whether any one fact was especially incriminating.
83. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 31, Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003) (No. 02-
809) ("[JUSTICE SOUTER]: Do you have a roll of bills exposed in your glove compartment?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: At times I do, Your Honor. [JUSTICE SOUTER]: You do? [DEFENSE
COUNSEL]: Yes."). In addition to underscoring the "plausibilistic" nature of the question
presented, Justice Souter's incredulity also teed up a joke. After defense counsel's second
affirmation that she "at times" carries wads of small bills in her glove compartment, Justice Souter
replied-to laughter from the audience-"You better be careful ifyou do." Id. (emphasis added).
84. See id. at 27:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: This is . .. 3:16 AM. It is in a residential area. This was not in
fact a high crime area. And I think under the totality of circumstances we have to put
that in context .... [I]t's 3:00 [AM] on a Saturday night with a car of three young men
in their twenties in a residential area, and I think anyone who has children of that age
knows that often their Saturday night does not even begin until 10:00 or 11:00 [PM].
85. Id. at 43-44 (emphasis added).
86. Indeed, the Court explicitly rebuked the Maryland Court of Appeals for concluding that
money, without more, is innocuous." Pringle, 540 U.S. at 372 n.2 (quoting Pringle v. State, 805
A.2d 1016, 1028 (2002)). The Court explained that "the [state] court's consideration of the money
in isolation, rather than as a factor in the totality of the circumstances, is mistaken in light of our
precedents." Id.
87. Id. at 373:
[W]e think it was reasonable for the officer to infer a common enterprise among the
three men. The quantity of drugs and cash in the car indicated the likelihood of drug
dealing, an enterprise to which a dealer would be unlikely to admit an innocent person




The relative plausibility framework also casts light on the
Court's approach to detection tools, like radar guns and canine units. A
"hit" from a detection tool is ambiguous between two inferences: (1)
wrongdoing (a true-positive) and (2) a malfunctioning tool (a false-
positive). The goal of relative plausibility analysis is to assess the
comparative strength of the first inference over the second. In short,
does the officer have grounds, all things considered, to infer that the
tool (whether animal or mineral) is reliable in general, and that it
performed correctly in context?
Take an everyday example: a highway patrol officer points a
radar gun at a car, measuring a speed in excess of the relevant limit.
Does the officer have grounds, based on the radar gun's output, to
perform a traffic stop (and, at her discretion, to issue a ticket)? In
general, the answer must be yes. Radar is a mainstay of speeding
enforcement. A theory of suspicion that failed to approve the use of
radar guns would be in serious trouble, I think, on reductio ad
absurdum grounds.
At the same time, however, the answer cannot be categorically
yes. Radar guns malfunction. Humans make mistakes. And if the facts
and circumstances, construed in their totality, indicate that a false-
positive may have occurred, an officer will not have cause to search
based on the gun's output, notwithstanding its reliability across cases.
The question, in other words, remains entirely context-bound. It
happens to be that in the lion's share of cases, contextual clues will
likely tilt in favor of inferring wrongdoing-because radar guns usually
work. To say this, however, is emphatically not to say that a radar gun's
output is sufficient grounds to justify a traffic stop. On the contrary, a
radar gun's output is never sufficient to justify a stop; it always needs
to be supplemented with an appreciation (and analysis) of surrounding
facts.
Another example-more prominent in the Court's case law-are
detection dogs. In Florida v. Harris,88 the Court blessed canine alerts
as an important, though not conclusive, factor in suspicion decisions.
The petitioner in Harris argued, echoing the Florida Supreme Court's
opinion below,89 that before a canine alert can justify a follow-up search,
officers must march through a "checklist" of variables, designed to test
88. 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1056-57 (2013).
89. See Harris v. State, 71 So.3d 756, 771-72 (Fla. 2011) ("[W]e ... hold that the State ...
must present all records and evidence that are necessary to allow the trial court to evaluate the
reliability of the dog.").
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the dog's reliability.90 Justice Kagan, writing for the Court, disagreed.
In her words, a checklist
is the antithesis of a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis. It is, indeed, the very thing
we criticized . .. when we overhauled our method for assessing the trustworthiness of an
informant's tip. A gap as to any one matter . . . should not sink the State's case; rather,
that deficiency may be compensated for, in determining the overall reliability of a tip, by
a strong showing as to other indicia of reliability. So too here, a finding of a [drug] dog's
reliability cannot depend on the . . . satisfaction of multiple, independent evidentiary
requirements. No more for dogs than for human informants is such an inflexible checklist
the way to prove reliability, and thus establish probable cause.9 1
Scholars have little affection for Harris. To many, the case seems
to afford law enforcement blanket authority to turn canine alerts-
already an under-regulated practice92-into intrusive searches in
virtually all cases.93
At a practical level, these misgivings are understandable. But it
is important to be clear about what, exactly, the case holds. The Harris
Court is not saying that canine alerts always generate probable cause.
Indeed, just the opposite-the Court is insisting that whether a specific
canine alert supports an inference of wrongdoing is an irreducibly case-
specific question.94 There are many contexts in which a canine alert
plausibly indicates wrongdoing. But the word "many" is important.
Exceptions matter. And the way to identify exceptions, Harris makes
clear, is by examining contextual clues, not consulting formal criteria.
In other words, as Justice Kagan put it, exceptions to a dog's general
reliability are identified the same way that "inquiry into probable
cause" always proceeds: by asking "whether all the facts surrounding a
90. 133 S. Ct. at 1056.
91. Id. (citations, internal quotation marks, and alterations omitted).
92. See, e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 411 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting):
At the heart . . . of . .. the Court's opinion today is the proposition that sniffs by a
trained dog are sui generis because a reaction by the dog in going alert is a response to
nothing but the presence of contraband. . . . Hence, the argument goes, because the sniff
can only reveal the presence of items devoid of any legal use, the sniff "does not
implicate legitimate privacy interests" and is not to be treated as a search.
(citations omitted).
93. See, e.g., Kit Kinports, The Dog Days of Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 108 NW. U. L.
REV. COLLOQUY 64, 65-66 (2013) (suggesting that Harris effectively establishes a bright-line rule
in favor of law enforcement); Rich, supra note 6, at 915-18 (compiling sources); see also Goldberg,
supra note 10, at 816-19 (exploring the mathematical difficulties of using dog alerts as the primary
input for suspicion); Richard E. Myers II, Detector Dogs and Probable Cause, 14 GEo. MASON L.
REV. 1, 12-18 (2006) (showing, via Bayes' Theorem, that inferring wrongdoing from a positive dog
alert is often statistically unsound).
94. That being said, commentators have not been wrong to fault Harris for offering scant
guidance-both for law enforcement officers on the ground and for lower courts charged with
reviewing their decisions-about what should drive contextual analysis. See, e.g., Rich, supra note
6, at 915-18 (compiling sources). On that front, the criticism of Harris is well taken. But it should
not be confused for a grievance with the Court's analytic framework.
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dog's alert ... would make a reasonably prudent person think that a
search would reveal contraband or evidence of a crime."9 5
Lower court jurisprudence reinforces the point. Equipped with
the contextual standard from Harris, appellate and trial courts have
proceeded exactly as one might expect: endorsing police reliance on
canine alerts in most cases-but not all cases. Typically, lower court
opinions proceed in two steps. First, they establish a baseline of
reliability by assessing the specific dog's performance under controlled
conditions.96 Second, they turn from the dog's aptitude in general to the
question of what the officer, in the particular case, observed-and
whether it was plausible, based on those observations, to infer
wrongdoing. In most cases, the answer is yes; if the dog is reliable, an
alert usually justifies a search. But in some cases-for example, when
it is ambiguous whether contraband truly occasioned the alert,97 or
when background conditions may have compromised the dog's
performance98-the answer is no. Either way, the courts have been
95. 133 S. Ct. at 1058. Along these lines, another aspect of Fourth Amendment law that the
relative plausibility framework helps explain is the particularity requirement of warrants
themselves--or, eally, of all searches and seizures carried out pursuant to probable cause. If a dog
alerts near Suspect X at an airport, the dog's handlers have some idea of where to search. If the
dog alerted on his body, they might perform a cavity search; if the dog alerted on a particular piece
of luggage, they might search that; and so on. Contrast this with a case in which no specific alert
occurs-rather, law enforcement uses a Contraband Detector (or the like) to pick out specific people
for searches. When the tool "alerts," where should law enforcement search? The person's body? All
his luggage? His home? In other words, the dog alert-much like informant testimony-conveys to
law enforcement a specific narrative of wrongdoing, albeit a crude one. The same is not necessarily
true of a suspicion algorithm. See, e.g., Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557 (2004) (holding a search
warrant for a residence invalid because it failed to "provide[] [any] description of the type of
evidence sought," thereby depriving the owner of any opportunity to "inspect[ ]" and enforce the
warrant's terms).
96. See, e.g., United States v. Trejo, 551 F. App'x 565, 568-71 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding a dog
alert reliable due to evidence of training and field performance); United States v. Green 740 F.3d
275, 282-84 (4th Cir. 2014) (same); see also United States v. Bentley, 795 F.3d 630, 635-37 (7th
Cir. 2015) (voicing concern about the drug dog's high false-positive rate, but deferring to the
district court's determination-largely in light of training evidence-that under TOC, the alert
was reliable); United States v. Thomas, 726 F.3d 1086, 1096-97 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding it non-
harmless error when the trial court failed to require law enforcement to turn over a dog's
performance records, because it deprived defendant of an opportunity to make meaningful
arguments about the reliability of the specific alert).
97. See, e.g., United States v. Funds in the Amount of One Hundred Thousand One Hundred
& Twenty Dollars ($100,120.00), 730 F.3d 711, 719-24 (7th Cir. 2013) (reversing trial court's grant
of summary judgment for the government, on the grounds that a question of fact existed as to
whether a dog's alert was in response to currency tainted with drugs-which would establish
probable cause-or, rather, in response to the presence of currency, period-which would not); see
also United States v. Simeon, 115 F. Supp. 3d 981, 1001-02 (N.D. Iowa 2015) (discussing the
importance of analyzing, in each particular case, whether "cueing" occurred before deeming the
alert reliable).
98. See, e.g., United States v. Heald, 165 F. Supp. 3d 765, 777-81 (W.D. Ark. 2016) (holding
that a dog's alert was unreliable, in context, notwithstanding solid training and credentials, mostly
due to the sweltering heat and the novelty of the circumstance).
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quite clear: consistent with Harris, the dispositive question is not the
dog's background reliability. It is what a reasonable officer, having
witnessed a particular alert in context, would understand it to signify.
Before moving on to normative analysis, it bears noting that
prediction tools-like the Contraband Detector-are analogous to radar
guns and detection dogs. All three raise the same fundamental
question: In context, does an official using the tool have grounds to
meaningfully distinguish true-positives from false-positives? The
difficulty with a tool like the Contraband Detector is that its output,
unlike that of a radar gun or a drug dog, does not occur in a context
(e.g., on a highway) that permits the addition of other variables by an
officer, thus facilitating an assessment of relative plausibility, as
between a true-positive and a false-positive. In fact, the whole point of
a tool like the Contraband Detector is to make predictions from
correlative variables out of context-a process that, by its nature,
frustrates inquiry into the tool's case-by-case performance, as
plausibility analysis requires.99
III. ARE EXPLANATIONS ILLUSORY?
That "plausible cause" maps neatly onto existing jurisprudence
does not necessarily mean, of course, that it is the correct way to
conceive of suspicion. For some observers, the pattern traced in the last
Part-the Court's affinity for narrative over numbers-is cause for
criticism, not praise. Relying on explanations rather than data, the
critics argue, makes room for heuristics like "training and
experience,"100 which are amorphous at best, and overtly discriminatory
99. What exactly it would mean to assess the case-specific performance of a tool like the
Contraband Detector is a question I reserve for future work; indeed, it is a question that I suspect
will occupy the forefront of many discussions about algorithmic governance over the next decade.
What does it mean for humans to stay "in the loop" of highly complex decisionmaking tools? In the
context of something like the Contraband Detector, what is the quantity and quality of knowledge
that an officer would require to put the tool's output into a meaningful analytic relationship with
other collected evidence?
100. See Bambauer, supra note 3, at 463:
Because the investigation methods approved by courts usually rely on the observations
and perceptions of police, the "particularized" evidence is likely to be biased, error
prone, and disproportionately aimed at poor and minority residents living in higher-
crime areas. Subjective factors like a suspect's "nervousness" or "furtive movements"




at worst. From this vantage point, algorithmic solutions like the
Contraband Detector promise to reform a status quo that seems, far too
often, dominated by whim and "hunch."01
The critique is well-taken-but the question, ultimately, is
whether we can afford to give up on explanations. In this Part and the
next, I will argue that we cannot. The argument has two steps. First, I
will show that, contrary to a prominent vein of scholarly criticism today,
not all inferences are statistical in nature. Although it is true that all
evidence relies, at some level, on generalization, a meaningful line can
be drawn between inferences that merely draw predictions from
observed facts and inferences that purport to explain those facts.
Explanatory power, in other words, is not an epistemic illusion.
Second, I extol the virtues of the explanatory approach to Fourth
Amendment suspicion, and of explanatory standards more generally.
On that front, the claim xplored in the next Part-is that
explanations allow judges to take account of values beyond accuracy,
many of which, though simple to state, are quite fundamental to our
legal system.
Particularity is axiomatic to criminal investigation. Open a
treatise or casebook, peruse the opening paragraphs of the Supreme
Court's latest Fourth Amendment opinion, and a familiar story
immediately jumps off the page. Before law enforcement officials may
engage in intrusive searches and seizures, they must have reason to
suspect this particular person, or that particular home, is connected to
criminal activity.02
id. at 463 n.7 (describing the prominent role that "furtive moments," as an overly thin justification
for performing Terry stops, played in the NYC stop-and-frisk litigation); see also Floyd v. City of
New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2013):
Two officers testified [at trial] to their understanding of the term "furtive movements."
One explained that "furtive movement is a very broad concept," and could include a
person "changing direction," "walking in a certain way," "[a]cting a little
suspicious," . . . "getting a little nervous, maybe shaking," and "stutterfing]." Another
officer explained that "usually" a furtive movement is someone "hanging out in front of
[a] building, sitting on the benches or something like that" . If officers believe that
the behavior described above constitutes furtive movement that justifies a stop, then it
is no surprise that stops so rarely produce evidence of criminal activity.
101. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990) (explaining that at a minimum, a Terry
stop requires "[t]he officer ... [to] be able to articulate something more than an inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion or hunch" (internal citations omitted) (quoting United States v.
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989))); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); see also, e.g., Floyd, 959
F. Supp. 2d at 567-68 (discussing the role of hunches in police investigations of suspicion).
102. See David A. Harris, Particularized Suspicion, Categorical Judgments: Supreme Court
Rhetoric Versus Lower Court Reality Under Terry v. Ohio, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 975, 977 (1998)
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Yet in spite of its hallowed status-or perhaps because of it-the
particularization norm has proven elusive. Why, exactly, does
particularized suspicion matter? What does it mean for an inference of
wrongdoing to attach to a specific "person, house, paper [or] effect"?
Recently, a number of scholars have argued that particularized
suspicion is a mirage.103 No matter how case-specific a given piece of
evidence feels, the way it conveys information about a particular case
is by relating that case to broader statistical trends. On this basis,
Professor Chris Slobogin has called "the distinction between
individualized and generalized suspicion meaningless."10 4 And
Professor Jane Bambauer has uggested that although "generalizations
can be [made] more finely grained . .. the nature of the prediction does
not change,"105 and once it becomes clear that the "difference[] between
general and particular decisionmaking [is one] of degree and not
differences in kind, we [rightly] become . . . skeptical of a widespread
(lamenting that suspicion requirements have eroded to such an extent that "Terry ... [has]
become, in practical terms, a decision which legally permits a stop and a frisk of almost anyone,
for almost any reason," which the Court "surely ... did not mean" when it first issued Terry);
Andrew E. Taslitz, What is Probable Cause and Why Should We Care?: The Costs, Benefits, and
Meaning of Individualized Suspicion, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 145, 189 (2010) ("The
individualized-suspicion requirement protects the uniqueness-fostering function of
privacy ... [requiring suspicion to] result from reliance on a sufficient quality and quantity of
evidence to support a reasonable and articulable concern about past or impending criminality by
this person."); see also DAVID GRAY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN AN AGE OF SURVEILLANCE
(forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at chs. IV-V) (on file with author) (arguing that the Fourth
Amendment's ratification-in response to general warrants and writs of assistance-was largely
about limiting the number of people and homes subject to intrusive surveillance); Rich, supra note
6, at 900-01 (explaining that the Fourth Amendment is first and foremost about "individualized
justice," and according that the Amendment's requirements "would not be satisfied," for example,
"if a police agency conducted ten searches, five on suspects who were almost certainly engaged in
criminal activity and five on suspects who almost certainly were not, on the ground that on average
probable cause existed" (emphasis omitted)); cf. Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L.
REV. 101, 110-15 (2008) (arguing that the police, because of their distinctive status, owe citizens
a heightened duty of care that entails, among other things, respect for individuality).
103. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 8; Bambauer, supra note 3; Harcourt & Meares, supra note 8;
Simmons, supra note 8. To date, Bambauer's analysis the most comprehensive; she sifts through
a litany of familiar rationales for individualization, each of which she eventually dismisses as
conceptually unfounded, normatively implausible, or both. See Bambauer, supra note 3, at 468-
81; see also Shaviro, supra note 24, at 537-38 (offering an equivalent argument in the context of
trials).
104. SLOBOGIN, supra note 8, at 40; see also Harcourt & Meares, supra note 8, at 850 ("If
anything, the 'individualized suspicion' construct prevents courts from conducting the right
inquiry," which "turns on the quantum of evidence [needed to establish a sufficient level of true
positives], not on whether [the evidence] is 'individualized' or not." (emphasis omitted)).
105. Bambauer, supra note 3, at 472.
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but mistaken view that the particular has . .. primacy over the
general."10 6 Other scholars echo these views.107
Consider an example. Police often rely on sensory observation to
justify stops. "The car was weaving; the driver seemed intoxicated." At
first blush, this sort of evidence may seem quintessentially
particularized; it pertains to one particular car and one particular
driver. But what is this evidence, really, apart from a claim-maybe
true, maybe not-about why cars tend to weave? By saying, "The driver
seemed intoxicated," what the officer means is that, based on
background knowledge, a common reason cars swerve is that the driver
has ingested alcohol or drugs. Can this be coherently described as
"particularized" evidence? It is certainly a general observation applied
to a particular set of observed facts. But on that view, all evidence is
particularized, so long as it is deployed in a specific case. That hardly
seems like what proponents of particularity have in mind.
Take this epistemic point seriously, the skeptics argue, and it
follows that "particularity" cannot truly be about the nature of the
evidence from which wrongdoing is inferred. So-the argument goes-
it must be about limiting the set of "person, houses, papers and effects"
subject to intrusion in practice. In other words, when we ask if an
inference of wrongdoing is "particularized," what we are really asking
is whether it stems from an investigative method that tends, as an
empirical matter, to pick out wrongdoing-instead of sweeping in
innocent conduct.108
The skeptics are correct in one sense, wrong in another. It is
true, at some level, that all evidence is statistical. But the skeptics move
too quickly from the idea that all evidence is statistical to the notion
that predictive accuracy forms the exclusive anchor of particularity.
Even if all evidence is statistical-even if "case-specific" evidence is an
106. Id. (citing FREDERICK SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES, AND STEREOTYPES 106 (2003));
see also Bacigal, supra note 7, at 297 (arguing that "[a]ll evidence is probabilistic, requires
inferences to support an ultimate conclusion, and thus involves a risk of error" and that
"[s]tatistical evidence is different only in that it makes these uncertainties explicit"). Apart from
these full-blown defenses of accuracy, there are a number of articles that try to "put the probability
back in probable cause," and in doing so, seem to presuppose that accuracy is the main, if not
exclusive, value anchoring Fourth Amendment law. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 10; Minzner,
supra note 10. But see Chris William Sanchirico, Character Evidence and the Object of Trial, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 1227, 1260-61 (2001) (distinguishing between "trace" and "character" evidence in
an effort to neutralize the "all evidence is statistical" objection).
107. See e.g., Harcourt & Meares, supra note 8; Simmons, supra note 8.
108. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 8, at 39-47 (developing a "proportionality" view of Fourth
Amendment suspicion that focuses on the strike rates of different investigative methods-
measured against intrusiveness-and explicitly eschews the "myth of individualized suspicion");
Bambauer, supra note 3, at 482-83 (arguing that the Fourth Amendment is designed to ensure a
reasonable balance between "hit" and "hassle" rates).
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illusion-there can still be case-specific explanations of evidence. In
other words, there is an important difference between constellations of
(statistical) evidence that support explanatory accounts of wrongdoing
and constellations of (statistical) evidence that do not. What makes a
theory of wrongdoing particularized is not the epistemic status of each
piece of evidence on which the theory rests. It is the relationship
between those pieces of evidence. As we saw in the last Part, this is the
notion of particularity that animates the Court's suspicion
jurisprudence-and it is the one I defend in the next Part.
IV. WHY EXPLANATIONS MATTER
Explanations matter-and explanatory standards ought to be
preserved, even in an age of powerful machines-because they enable
consideration of two sets of values beyond accuracy. The first consists
of constitutional constraints; in what follows, I will focus specifically on
the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause. The second
consists of general legality principles, rooted doctrinally in the Due
Process Clause but at some level suffused throughout legal
decisionmaking, which separate lawful uses of state power from ultra
vires conduct. In both cases, explanations further the same goal. They
permit judges-and ultimately, the polity-to decide whether police
conduct, whatever its accuracy, meshes with recognized limitations on
the exercise of power.
The idea here is simple: we cannot effectively regulate what we
do not understand. Whether that "we" refers to judges, reviewing
decisions case-by-case, or to legislatures and administrative bodies,
setting rules across the board, the point stands.109 Accuracy is not the
be-all and end-all of sound decisionmaking. This does not mean that
accuracy is irrelevant. It is certainly a value we care about.110 But it is
109. See, e.g., Paul W. Kahn & Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Statutes and Democratic Self-
Authorship, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 115, 173-77 (2014) (arguing that legislation and judicial
review share a common goal of reinforcing popular sovereignty by producing legal rules, and
specific interpretations of those rules, that the people can imagine themselves as having authored).
Part of my aim here is to highlight the complementary role that judges, in reviewing individual
cases and addressing specific grievances in the Fourth Amendment setting, play vis-A-vis
administrative governance structures. On the latter front, see, for example, Barry Friedman &
Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827 (2015); Daphna Renan, The
Fourth Amendment as Administrative Governance, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1039 (2016); and Christopher
Slobogin, Policing as Administration, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 91 (2016). In my view, the idea of applying
administrative law norms to policing makes good sense-in fact, it is long overdue-but I think it
should supplement, not substitute for, the systemic constraints imposed by Fourth Amendment
rules.
110. This is true for both intrinsic and instrumental reasons. Accuracy is good as such-and
error, bad as such-which by itself counsels in favor of paying attention to accuracy rates. But
observations of accuracy (as well as inaccuracy) also help to assess the strength (or weakness) of
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not the only value we care about. Other values matter. And explanatory
standards allow conflict between divergent values to be managed."
A. Constitutional Values
To begin with, explanations help to safeguard constitutional
values. Suppose it comes to light that the Contraband Detector draws
largely, or even primarily, on targets' political associations or religious
affiliations to predict wrongdoing.112 Or suppose it turns out that race-
or a close proxy for race, such as arrest history or zip code-has
substantial weight in the tool's model.113
Revelations like these would give many of us pause, regardless
of whether these variables predict wrongdoing in a statistical sense. If
commonly offered explanations. A helpful example is the New York City stop-and-frisk litigation.
There, one of the key facts-anchoring Judge Scheindlin's holding that the NYPD's policy
systematically violated Fourth Amendment rights-was its abysmal true-positive rate. See Floyd
v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 558 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding that only six percent of
stops led to arrests, and much fewer to the discovery of weapons). It is possible, of course, to
describe this deficiency solely in terms of accuracy-that is, to suggest that the problem with stop-
and-frisk was its poor predictive performance. See, e.g., Bambauer, supra note 3, at 488-90
(offering an argument to that effect). But in my view, the more plausible construction of Judge
Scheindlin's opinion is that the program's dismal true-positive rate not only raises eyebrows under
an accuracy model; it also casts doubt on the intelligibility of a large portion of routine stops. In
her holding as to Monell liability, for example, Judge Scheindlin made clear that a six percent hit
rate was of a piece, conceptually, with (1) the finding that "36% of [stop-and-frisk reports]" failed
to "identify a suspected crime" at all, and (2) the finding that the "two most commonly checked
stop factors," namely, "Furtive Movements" and "High Crime Area," were too boilerplate to be
meaningful. Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 660. In Judge Scheindlin's view, all three pieces of evidence
spoke to the same core problem: that the NYPD had effectively created a climate of ubiquitous
stops, in which everyone was (potentially) suspicious at any moment, with no intelligible link to
actual behavior. Id. (concluding that the thin justifications offered on many stop-and-frisk reports,
coupled with the low true-positive rate, indicated that the NYPD had made effectively
suspicionless stops part of its "standard operating procedure"); see, e.g., Tracey L. Meares,
Programming Errors: Understanding the Constitutionality of Stop-and-Frisk as a Program, Not
an Incident, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 159 (2015).
111. It bears noting that explanatory standards do not necessarily subtract from statistical
accuracy; indeed, they might actually enhance statistical accuracy. Which way they cut is an
empirical question, wholly dependent on context-it turns on whether human oversight of an
otherwise-automated predictive process stands to correctly exclude false-positives or, rather, to
incorrectly exclude true-positives. See, e.g., Rich, supra note 6, at 899.
112. This has been a long-standing criticism of the FBI's so-called "no-fly list," which recently
provoked a lawsuit alleging that the list includes a disproportionate number of Muslims. See, e.g.,
Bamzi Banchiri, No Fly-List: Vital Security Measure or State-Sanctioned Religious Profiling?,
CHRISTIAN ScI. MONITOR (Apr. 5, 2016), http://www.csmonitor.comfUSA/Justice/2016/0405/No-fly-
list-vital-security-measure-or-state-sanctioned-religious-profiling-video [https://perma.cc/SF82-
TUJ9].
113. See, e.g., Lauren Kirchner, When Discrimination Is Baked into Algorithms, ATLANTIC
(Sept. 6, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/09/discrimination-algorithms-
disparate-impact/403969/ [https://perma.cc/BUY7-TMP9] (exploring the way that zip code
information-among other inputs-ends up contributing to disparities in algorithmic
decisionmaking).
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they do not, so much the worse: sensitive variables have been used
gratuitously.11 4 But even if they do, it would still be troubling, because
the notion that one's political views, religious convictions, or race could
give rise to an outsized risk of intrusion by the state is cause for
constitutional concern no matter the variables' probative value."5 This
does not mean, of course, that sensitive variables must be banished
from suspicion decisions outright. But it does mean that theories of
wrongdoing that make use of such variables demand more exacting
scrutiny-a judicial function that automation, even if carried out by a
very powerful machine, would be unable to replicate.
To begin with, consider First Amendment-sensitive variables.
The Supreme Court has long recognized the importance of caution-
and the need for constitutional balancing-when the enforcement of
criminal law bears on expression or association. When the state draws
on information about one's beliefs or associations to make adverse
decisions, it freights the exercise of First Amendment rights;
accordingly, the Court has developed a tailoring regime that asks
whether expressive or associational data was necessary to serve the
interests at hand and whether its use was adequately cabined to avoid
constitutional problems.
Take Dawson v. Delaware,116 which held that petitioner's
associational rights were infringed when, at sentencing, the state
adduced his membership in the Aryan Brotherhood as evidence of bad
character. In arriving at this result, the Court explicitly rejected
petitioner's view that all "beliefs [and] activities" are off-limits as
aggravating evidence."7 "[T]he Constitution," the Court made clear,
"does not erect a per se barrier to the admission of evidence concerning
one's beliefs and associations . . . simply because those beliefs and
associations are protected by the First Amendment."118 The problem in
Dawson's case, however, was that membership in the Aryan
114. In practice, this is a huge problem. For the foreseeable future, in fact, it may be the most
important problem we face. See, e.g., Julia Angwin, Jeff Larson, Surya Mattu & Lauren Kirchner,
Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-
assessments-in-criminal-sentencing [https://perma.cc/EPC8-APAT] (excavating examples of racial
disparities in the outputs of a recidivism algorithm that ended up being wildly wrong).
115. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 13 (1978) ("[I]t is unjust to put
someone in jail on the basis of a judgment about a class, however accurate, because that denies his
claim to equal respect as an individual."); Andrea Roth, Trial by Machine, 104 GEO. L.J. 1245
(2016) (exploring how data analysis is deployed by courts asymmetrically-often to intensify
punitive measures-and arguing that the resulting distributive effects are lamentable regardless
of underlying accuracy).
116. 503 U.S. 159 (1992).
117. Id. at 164.
118. Id. at 165.
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Brotherhood pointed only to "abstract beliefs."119 It would have been one
thing, the Court reasoned, for the state to use Dawson's association to
show that he, in particular, was of poor character. But letting the jury
draw a negative inference from the association by itself was a bridge too
far.
Similar reasoning was on display, this time at the guilt stage, in
Virginia v. Black.120 There, the Court struck down a portion of a
Virginia statute banning cross-burning, on the grounds that it allowed
the fact that a cross was burned-absent independent mens rea
evidence-to serve as "prima facie evidence of an intent to
intimidate."121 This, the Court reasoned, made it at least theoretically
possible that someone could be convicted under the statute for engaging
in no more than First Amendment-protected activity. What if, for
example, the cross-burning occurred at a Ku Klux Klan rally on private
property, as an expression of support for the group's ideology? The
possibility that a person could, in principle, be convicted on that basis
alone was too much for the Court.
As First Amendment cases go, Dawson and Black are outliers,
in that neither case involved punishment directly on the basis of an
association or belief (or on the basis of speech or religion).122 Rather,
both involved an effort by the state to draw normal evidentiary
inferences that, if based solely on unprotected conduct, would be
entirely permissible, but that, in practice, could too easily be based on
protected conduct. In other words, it was the difficulty of collating
between protected and unprotected conduct, due to their functional
similarities, that bothered the Court. Even Black, the closer of the two
cases, simply involved the risk that protected conduct would
erroneously form the basis of punishment-due to jury confusion-since
there was no doubt that the conduct actually proscribed by the statute
(burning a cross with the intent to intimidate) was, and remains,
unprotected.
The best way to parse the normative principle underlying
Dawson and Black, then, is this: because expressive activity comes in
protected and unprotected forms, before the state may rely on
119. Id. at 166-67.
120. 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
121. Id. at 348.
122. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2547 (2012):
Permitting the government to decree this speech to be a criminal offense, whether
shouted from the rooftops or made in a barely audible whisper, would endorse
government authority to compile a list of subjects about which false statements are
punishable. That governmental power has no clear limiting principle. Our




expressive activity as the linchpin of adverse treatment, it must
demonstrate an effort to tailor; it must show that some attempt was
made to distinguish unprotected versions of expressive activity from
their protected counterparts.1 2 3 Thus, Dawson's affiliation with the
Aryan Brotherhood might have been admissible-had the state shown
that something about his affiliation, in particular, suggested poor
character-and Mr. Black's conviction might have been sound, if the
jury charge had distinguished more finely between cross-burning that
is merely expressive and cross-burning that is not.
From a purely evidentiary standpoint, this "tailoring" logic rings
strange. It seems implausible, to say the least, that affiliation with a
prison gang is not probative of poor character,124 or that the act of cross-
burning is not probative-on its face-of an intent to intimidate. But
this simply speaks to how porous a category "probative value" is.
Probative is not the same as dispositive. To say that affiliation with a
prison gang is probative of bad character, or that cross-burning is
probative of intent to intimidate, is not the end of the matter; it is the
beginning of the matter. Mr. Dawson was free, of course, to introduce
evidence of good character-which he did-and also free to rebut the
proposition that, either in his case or in general, affiliation with the
Aryan Brotherhood implies bad character. Likewise, any defendant
prosecuted under the Virginia cross-burning statute at issue in Black
would be free to introduce facts-including live testimony from the
defendant himself-that tend to disprove intent to intimidate. Indeed,
that is exactly what it means for the fact of cross-burning to operate as
prima facie evidence: it is probative only "on its face," that is, only until
rebutted. 125
None of this, however, seemed to matter much to the majorities
in Dawson and Black. Rather, the upshot of both cases is that some
inferences, regardless of probative value, cut too close to First
Amendment rights to be permissible. More specifically, before the state
may employ such inferences, it must work, as it failed to do in both
123. For an illuminating analysis of another realm where protected and unprotected forms of
expression blur-and similar First Amendment concerns arise-see Andrew Gilden, Punishing
Sexual Fantasy, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 419 (2016) (examining criminal punishments for
exploration of sexual fantasies online).
124. As Justice Thomas, dissenting in Dawson, put it, "Jurors do not leave their knowledge of
the world behind when they enter a courtroom," and because of this, "[d]enying that [Mr.] Dawson's
gang membership told the jury anything about his activities, tendencies, and traits-his
'character'-ignores reality." Dawson, 503 U.S. at 171-72 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
125. Black, 538 U.S. at 369-70 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in
part, and dissenting in part) ("The established meaning ... of the term 'prima facie evidence' [is]
perfectly orthodox: It is evidence that suffices, on its own, to establish a particular fact. But it is
hornbook law that this is true only to the extent that the evidence goes unrebutted.").
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Dawson and Black, to ensure that First Amendment values have been
accommodated.
This principle applies with equal force to suspicion decisions. For
one thing, nothing in the principle's logic gives rise to a meaningful
distinction between suspicion, on one hand, and guilt and sentencing,
on the other. The heart of the principle is that First Amendment
concerns transcend probative value-and probative value is just as
operative at the suspicion stage as elsewhere. It is certainly possible
that First Amendment values are less important at the suspicion stage
than they are at the guilt or sentencing stages. But the key proposition,
when it comes to justifying explanatory standards and corresponding
oversight, is simply that First Amendment values matter. How much
they matter is a question to be answered in the performance of
oversight; to justify the need for oversight, the important point is that
First Amendment values matter at all. That is what necessitates case-
specific, value-sensitive review.
Second, the Supreme Court has already recognized the
importance of First Amendment values in the surveillance context-
specifically, in its "freedom of association" jurisprudence. Reaching back
to the canonical case of NAACP v. Alabama, where the Court quashed
a subpoena seeking to obtain the NAACP's membership list, likening it
to "[a] requirement that adherents of particular religious faiths or
political parties wear identifying arm-bands,"1 26 the Court has long
recognized that information-gathering practices meet with different
scrutiny depending on the First Amendment interests involved.127
The same holds true for probable cause determinations. As
Professor Kathy Strandburg has shown, the principle underpinning the
Court's freedom of association cases is, at base, a tailoring requirement:
the collection and use of associational data must "promote a specific
compelling government interest," must "have a sufficiently close nexus
to that specific interest," and "must be necessary, in the sense that there
are no substantially less burdensome means to achieve that specific
126. 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) ("We think that the production order, in the respects here drawn
in question, must be regarded as entailing the likelihood of a substantial restraint upon the
exercise by petitioner's members of their right to freedom of association."). For a more
contemporary example, see United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (arguing that GPS monitoring should qualify as a Fourth Amendment "search"-
requiring probable cause-because it "generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person's
public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional,
religious, and sexual associations").
127. See Linda E. Fisher, Guilt by Expressive Association: Political Profiling, Surveillance and
the Privacy of Groups, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 621 (2004); Katherine J. Strandburg, Freedom of
Association in a Networked World: First Amendment Regulation ofRelational Surveillance, 49 B.C.
L. REV. 741 (2008).
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interest."128 In the suspicion context, the first two conditions are
virtually always satisfied. Apprehending criminals is undoubtedly a
"specific compelling interest," and explanations adduced in pursuit of
that purpose self-evidently satisfy the "close nexus" requirement. But
the third requirement-necessity-reintroduces some play in the joints.
When reviewing explanations offered by police to justify inferences of
wrongdoing, judges have an opportunity to ask if associational data is
"necessary." In other words, could the same investigative goals have
been served in the absence of associational data? If so, further scrutiny
is warranted, because the tension between First Amendment values
and statistical likelihood-however great-has not been properly
balanced.
On the equal protection side, the law is murkier-not least
because the state rarely invokes race, the way it sometimes invokes
association or belief, as a variable in adverse decisionmaking.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has never addressed the proper use of
race in suspect-profiles (e.g., when police target individuals based on
physical descriptions-"White male between 18-24 with a red hoodie"-
offered by victims or witnesses). But there are a number of appellate
cases on point, and they speak uniformly: the use of race in suspect-
profiles, based on witness or victim testimony, does not qualify as a
race-based classification subject to strict scrutiny. 129 As the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit once summed it up, invoking "common
sense" as authority: "when determining whom to approach as a suspect
of criminal wrongdoing, a police officer may legitimately consider race
as a factor if descriptions of the perpetrator known to the officer include
race."130
Whether or not this reasoning is sound, and there are plenty who
think it is not,131 the use of race in suspect-profiles stands in sharp
128. Katherine J. Strandburg, Membership Lists, Metadata, and Freedom of Association's
Specification Requirement, 10 I/S: J.L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. SOC'Y 327, 331 (2014) (emphasis omitted);
see also Deven R. Desai, Constitutional Limits on Surveillance: Associational Freedom in the Age
of Data Hoarding, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 579 (2014).
129. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 200 F.3d 1053 (7th Cir. 2000); Brown v. City of Oneonta,
221 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v. Lopez-Martinez, 25 F.3d 1481 (10th Cir. 1994).
130. United States v. Waldon, 206 F.3d 597, 604 (6th Cir. 2000).
131. See, e.g., Brown v. City of Oneonta, 235 F.3d 769, 779-92 (2d Cir. 2000) (Calabresi, J.,
dissenting-vociferously-from denial of rehearing en banc). For background on the debates
surrounding race-based suspect-profiles, see R. Richard Banks, The Story of Brown v. City of
Oneonta: The Uncertain Meaning of Racially Discriminatory Policing Under the Equal Protection
Clause, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 223 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2004).
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contrast to the use of race in general to guide law enforcement. The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, for example, has made clear, in
the course of upholding the use of race in suspect-profiles, that it would
not be acceptable under the Equal Protection Clause for the police to
"use[] an established profile of ... criminal[ity]" based on race, or to
adopt a "regular policy based upon racial stereotypes."132 In other
words, even in the sensitive context of race, courts have sought to strike
a balance: distinguishing between different uses of race, and weighing
the value of those uses in the law enforcement process against
countervailing constitutional values.
The key question, of course, is what makes a "profile of
criminality" based on race-and similarly, what constitutes "racial
stereotypes" in the formulation of policy. Furthermore, how do proxy
variables-i.e., variables apart from race that closely track race at a
functional level-fit into this picture? These questions are not easy, and
new technology has only magnified the difficulty. The outputs of
machine learning algorithms confirm, and render tangible, what
sociologists have long understood: that in a nation like ours, with its
history of de jure and de facto racial subordination, interwoven with
other forms of structural inequality, many variables serve as proxies for
race. Zip codes are perhaps the best-known example, with their overt
connection to hideous practices of mortgage-redlining.1 33 But zip codes
are just the tip of the iceberg. Going forward-in a world of algorithmic
decisionmaking where seemingly disparate variables become
increasingly hard to disentangle-we will likely need to reconsider
which variables qualify as sensitive by virtue of their connection to race
(as well as gender, and other traditionally protected categories).134
In short, there is great indeterminacy today about what
constitutes a "proxy variable." If anything, however, this indeterminacy
intensifies the need for oversight. One piece of the puzzle is judicial: by
requiring police to explain their inferences of wrongdoing, judges can
consider whether those explanations track known proxies for race,
gender, and other protected categories. As just one example, in the
recent challenge to New York City's (now reformed) stop-and-frisk
program, Judge Scheindlin of the Southern District of New York
132. Brown, 221 F.3d at 337.
133. See, e.g., Sarah Ludwig, Credit Scores in America Perpetuate Racial Injustice. Here's How,
GUARDIAN (Oct. 13, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/oct/13/your-credit-
score-is-racist-heres-why [https://perma.cc/X3N5-2UPV].
134. For a discussion of this question-in the employment setting, but presenting identical
issues-see Barocas & Selbst, supra note 17; see also Pauline T. Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination
at Work, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2017).
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recognized that reports of "furtive movement," offered by NYPD officers
to justify Terry stops, often operated as a proxy for race in practice.135
Another piece of the oversight puzzle is legislative.136 As a polity,
we are free to set the parameters of a category like "proxy variable" as
we see fit; though seemingly descriptive, even scientific, in some sense
the category simply consists of normative designations about which
variables are fair bases for decisions and which are not. To make such
designations properly, however, we must understand which variables
are actually being used. Knowing what kinds of variables officials rely
on to justify the use of power-which can only come through
explanations-is a precondition of regulating those variables.
B. Rule-of-Law Values
Apart from safeguarding constitutional values, explanations
also vindicate rule-of-law principles. A key tenet of legality, separating
lawful authority from ultra vires conduct, is the idea that not all
explanations qualify as justifications.137 An official cannot, for example,
rely on the explanation that he strongly wished to perform Act X as
authority to perform Act X. Nor can he rely on the explanation that God
told him to. Nor, at least under normal circumstances, can he rely on
135. See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 578 (S.D.N.Y. 2013):
Many of the checkboxes on the [Terry stop form] that officers use to indicate the basis
for a stop are problematic. "Furtive Movements" is vague and subjective. In fact, an
officer's impression of whether a movement was "furtive" may be affected by
unconscious racial biases. "Fits Description" is a troubling basis for a stop if the
description is so general that it fits a large portion of the population in the area, such
as black males between the ages of 18 and 24.
136. It bears noting that the validity of democracy-focused argumentation in constitutional
law is a source of controversy. I will not endeavor to comment on (much less to resolve) that
controversy here, except to note my sympathy with democracy-enhancing conceptions of judicial
review. See generally STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION (2005) (arguing that constitutional jurisprudence should proceed with an eye to
facilitating participatory governance); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980) (arguing that judicial review is legitimate only insofar as it enhances
democratic structures of governance).
137. See, e.g., Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125 (2016) (explaining that
agency rulemaking is "procedurally defective" and unworthy of Chevron deference, when, among
other things, the "agency [fails to] give adequate reasons for its decisions," because that renders
the decisions "arbitrary and capricious and [incapable ofj carry[ing] the force of law"); Malcolm
Thorburn, Justifications, Powers, and Authority, 117 YALE L.J. 1070, 1103-07 (2008) (describing
the warrant requirement, and other doctrines that legitimize police officers, as conceptually akin
to justification rules in criminal law); see also Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of
Chenery, 116 YALE L.J. 952 (2007) (exploring the importance of reason-giving in administrative
law). In this vein, it is worth remembering that warrants operate as a species of "justification" for
otherwise illicit activity (such as trespass). It is imperative, therefore, that the basis for warrants-
as a basis for legal justification-stay amenable to democratic oversight.
PLAUSIBLE CAUSE
the explanation that a good reason for performing Act X exists, but,
alas, he cannot divulge what it is.
These are just three examples of explanations that do not qualify
as justificatory. What unites them, for our purposes, is that all three
flout legality principles. Most importantly, they flout the idea that law's
mandates cannot be unduly vague-that both state officials and
members of the public must have a predictable sense x ante of what
conduct is and is not allowed.
As the Supreme Court, echoing generations of legal
philosophy,138 has made clear, the prohibition on vagueness erves two
interconnected goals. First, it gives members of the public "fair notice"
about what conduct invites punishment-or, in the context of
enforcement, what conduct invites intrusion. Second, it constrains the
state's discretion. Vague legal bounds "permit a standardless sweep
[that] allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal
predilections."13 9 Sometimes, this is a necessary evil, to the extent that
legal standards defy principled articulation; the Court has suggested,
for instance, that disturbance of the peace may be an example of a
permissibly vague prohibition, to the extent that it demands "on-the-
spot assessment of the need to keep order."140 But this is an exception,
and the general rule could not be clearer: where vagueness "permits. . .
selective law enforcement, there is a denial of due process."141
Furthermore, the prohibition on vagueness, though often discussed in
the context of prosecution,142 indisputably extends to policing. In fact,
policing and prosecution are two sides of the same coin: a standard that,
due to vagueness, enables discretionary prosecution is equally
unacceptable for leaving enforcement decisions to the "whim of ...
police."143
138. The best known example, though certainly not the only example, of this theme in legal
philosophy comes from Lon Fuller's famous thought experiment about Rex, an imaginary king who
tries to reform the legal system to better accommodate his benevolence, but who finds himself
running into various legality principles in the meantime. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF
LAW 137-38 (rev. ed. 1969). For an excellent contemporary example in the same vein, see SCOTT
J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 73-76 (2011).
139. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983) (alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974) (arguing that the Constitution
stands "against entrusting lawmaking to the moment-to-moment judgment of the policeman on
his beat" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
140. Goguen, 415 U.S. at 581.
141. Id. at 576.
142. For the Court's most recent elaboration, see Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551
(2015) (holding the Armed Career Criminal Act's "residual clause"-a provision only triggered at
sentencing, and thus one that had no effect on policing-unconstitutional on vagueness grounds).
143. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 90 (1965). For other reasoning to this
effect, see Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 94 MINN. L.
REV. 1561, 1574-75 (2010) (collecting and summarizing cases).
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Both goals of the prohibition on vagueness-giving notice to the
public and constraining the discretion of officials-are implicated by the
methods police use to generate probable cause. Moreover, unexplained
inferences of wrongdoing, such as outputs from the Contraband
Detector, fail on both fronts at once.
First, unexplained inferences of wrongdoing fail to give
individuals adequate notice of the law's content. Consider a simple
hypothetical--or, rather, twin hypotheticals.
> Scenario One: The police show up at Lyra's door with a valid
warrant, demanding entry. Lyra lets the police in, and they
proceed to toss her apartment. After an hour, with the
apartment in disarray, the police come up empty-handed. They
leave. Upset about he encounter, Lyra gets in touch with her
local precinct, seeking to determine why the search of her
apartment was warranted. Eventually, a supervisor explains
that the police had reason to suspect hat an illicit gambling ring
is being run out of Lyra's building; that the layout of Lyra's
apartment and its proximity to the building's back door would
make it particularly easy to set up a makeshift gambling parlor;
and that other tenants reported visitor patterns to and from
Lyra's apartment over the last few weeks consistent with a
gambling ring. (In fact, Lyra just returned from a multi-week
vacation, during which time her younger brother-a wild law
student-was using the apartment to throw parties.)
> Scenario Two: Same facts as Scenario One, except that when
Lyra asks about the basis for the warrant, she instead receives
the following response: "Your apartment was flagged as
"suspicious" by the Contraband Detector, a tool we use to locate
gambling rings around the city." When Lyra asks what variables
the tool relies on-in other words, what about her conduct
triggered the tool's "suspicious" designation?-the supervisor
concedes that he does not know. The tool uses hundreds of input-
variables. No one in the department understands how it works.
The supervisor also assures Lyra, however, that the Contraband
Detector performs very reliably across cases; in fact, the
Department recently brought in a team of data scientists to




What is the difference between these scenarios? In both cases, it
would be natural for Lyra to be frustrated about the intrusion she was
forced to endure. And reasonable minds could disagree, I think, about
which investigative method-traditional boots-on-the-ground
exploration or the use of automated detection tools-is preferable, all
things considered.144 It is easy to imagine Lyra expressing greater
dismay in Scenario Two ("How can the police barge into my apartment
just because it came up on some database?"), but equally easy, I think,
to imagine her expressing a preference for Scenario Two, particularly
if-perhaps based on her community's experience with law
enforcement-she regards traditional police investigation as a means,
too often, of abuse and pretext.
In terms of legality principles, however, the trouble with
Scenario Two is that it fails to establish a discernible ex ante
benchmark of suspicious conduct. This has two consequences. First, it
leaves members of the public (like Lyra) without any sense of what
activity occasions intrusion. Of course, Scenario One also involves a
significant amount of uncertainty. Before the fact, it is unlikely that
Lyra could have predicted that her brother's use of the apartment in
her absence, coupled with the details of its layout and place in the
building, would arouse police suspicion. And it is even less likely that
Lyra would have taken steps to prevent police intrusion.
But the point of the "fair notice" principle is not that all members
of the public must be able to exactly predict-and avoid-all conduct
that could conceivably lead to intrusion or punishment down the line.
The point is that an average person must have some sense of what falls
on that side of the line. Although the law need not adhere to "impossible
standards of clarity,"145 it must have enough "definiteness that ordinary
people can understand what conduct is prohibited."146 There is a
difference, in other words, between "an imprecise but comprehensible
normative standard" and "no standard of conduct ... at all."147
Unexplained inferences of wrongdoing-even statistically powerful
ones-fall in the latter category.
Second, and more importantly, Scenario Two raises concerns
about law enforcement discretion. Absent an explanatory
144. It is not inconceivable, for instance, that populations in highly policed neighborhoods
would prefer the use of automated detection tools-if only for reasons of damage control-given
the sheer amount of interference with everyday life occasioned by traditional boots-on-the-ground
investigation. Cf. Bambauer, supra note 3, at 482 (noting that traditional policing methods
"distribute their intrusions in severely regressive ways").
145. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 361 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted).
146. Id. at 357.
147. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971).
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requirement-under a purely statistical conception of suspicion-police
would be empowered to act on any strong correlation, no matter its
intelligibility. This, in turn, would allow them to make targeting
decisions absent judicial supervision: the exact phenomenon the Fourth
Amendment originally was designed to rein in. 148
It may seem odd to describe unexplained-but-powerful
inferences as an enabling condition of discretion; after all, one of the
great promises of machine learning tools like the Contraband Detector
(or its real-world equivalent) is that it at least supplants traditional
investigative methods, which fare notoriously poorly on statistical
metrics. The difficulty is that the discretion prong of anti-vagueness
doctrine does not focus on which individuals are targeted or how many
individuals are targeted. It focuses on the targeting of individuals,
period-the envisioned harm is that of police enjoying "complete
discretion . .. to determine whether [a] suspect ... must be permitted
to go on his way." 149
The problem with vague standards, in other words, is not that
they give police cover to make incorrect decisions; it is that they give
police cover to make unaccountable decisions. And this is clearly true of
the Contraband Detector (and of unexplained decisions in general).
Imagine, for example, if the tool turned up one thousand residences in
New York City, all eighty percent likely to contain illegal weapons. (In
other words, imagine if the tool was capable of identifying one thousand
residences, eight hundred of which are connected to wrongdoing.) One
thing the NYPD might do in response is seek warrants to search all one
thousand residences. More likely, however, the NYPD would begin
picking and choosing among targets, knowing that in every case a
warrant would be guaranteed to issue. It is precisely this style of
discretion that the Fourth Amendment was ratified at the Founding to
protect against-and likewise, that vagueness rules aim to combat.150
148. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983) (implying that "dragnet type law
enforcement practices" are particularly suspect under the Fourth Amendment); Berger v. New
York, 388 U.S. 41, 65 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring) (explicating the prohibition against general
warrants as a concern about "dragnet, sweeping" intrusions "upon the privacy of those not even
suspected of crime"). The Fourth Amendment's aversion to dragnet surveillance is a prominent
theme among scholars. See, e.g., Katherine J. Strandburg, Home, Home on the Web and Other
Fourth Amendment Implications of Technosocial Change, 70 MD. L. REV. 614, 667 (2011)
("Supreme Court opinions have repeatedly recognized the danger that technological advances
might turn plain view observation into constitutionally troubling dragnet searches.").
149. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358.
150. At a normative level, the reasoning here is related to the First Amendment and equal
protection values described above: part of why discretion is worrisome is that we worry about police




Fortunately, explanations address both ailments-lack of notice
and unsupervised discretion-in one swoop. Explanations do this by
enabling consideration of the "other side of the story." They allow judges
to compare law enforcement's theory of wrongdoing to the strongest
innocent version of events (that a judge can imagine) and decide which
account of observed facts, in context, is most convincing.
This analytic process serves a dual purpose. First, it guarantees
that the reasons for intrusion are, at least to some extent, predictable,
because it ties intrusion to activity that appears more plausibly guilty
than innocent. Second, the "other side of the story" principle constrains
police discretion. This is true in two ways. For one thing, it requires
police to expend the resources necessary to develop genuine theories of
wrongdoing, instead of relying on untailored-if powerful-predictive
shorthand. For another thing, it ensures that suspects are
"represented" in the warranting process, despite the absence of a formal
adversarial dynamic. Suspicion decisions happen behind closed doors
for a reason: it would subvert the investigation process to permit (much
less require) suspects to be fully represented in the process. From this,
however, it hardly follows that suspects are entitled to no voice. Nor
does the ex parte nature of warranting vitiate the state's burden of
proof. Before the police may intrude on private life, they must persuade
a judge that intrusion is warranted. And that requires an
explanation.15 1
In adversarial settings, this dynamic-and its normative
value-is obvious. In everyday motion practice, no less than trial, we
ensure that affected parties' perspectives are taken into account by
having counsel represent them. Indeed, many of our procedural and
evidentiary rules are designed precisely to safeguard the integrity of
such representation. 152 But accounting for an affected party's
151. See Stein, The New Doctrinalism, supra note 25, at 2090-92 (developing a "second-
personal" account of evidence rules, modeling "adjudicative factfinding" as "a contest between the
plaintiffs (or the prosecutor's) and the defendant's stories," in which legitimacy is defined, in part,
by responsiveness to the affected party's version of events); see also STEIN, supra note 42
(developing these themes in greater detail). For further discussion, see David Alan Sklansky, Anti-
Inquisitorialism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1634, 1686 (2009) (identifying "meaningful participation by
the defendant" and "respect for human dignity" as values rightly associated-at least in broad
strokes-with the adversarial process).
152. See, e.g., United States v. Stever, 603 F.3d 747, 755-57 (9th Cir. 2010) (overturning the
trial court's evidentiary rulings that curbed a criminal defendant's access to evidence that would
have supported an alternate theory of the known facts). This is certainly part of what underpins
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, as well as the Fifth Amendment right to exculpatory
material, among other rights. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691-92 (1984) ("The
purpose of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a defendant has the
assistance necessary to justify reliance on the outcome of the proceeding."); Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) ("Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal
trials are fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated
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perspective is not a value unique to adversarial settings. It also matters
in unilateral and ex parte settings that require an adjudicator to decide,
based on limited and indeterminate evidence, whether departure from
the presumption of innocence is justified.153 Even when an affected
party is not privy to the proceedings, and has no opportunity to tell her
side of the story directly, it is still important for the interpretive
mechanism to be one that considers her side of the story, however
imperfectly, in the process of adjudication.
Sometimes, all this will mean is that the state has offered facts
that are probative of wrongdoing and admit of no innocent account.154
Other times, it will mean that at least one plausible innocent account
is available, but the state has built a strong enough case to tip the scales
toward wrongdoing, all things considered.15 5 Either way, the upshot is
the same. A decision that takes the other side of the story into account,
even in the course of rejecting it, is particularized in the sense that it is
capable of persuasion in the specific case. Predictive decisions, by
contrast, have a take-it-or-leave-it quality. When the Contraband
Detector picks out "285 Court St., Apt. 2L" as suspicious, or an
electricity usage algorithm indicates that a residence has outsized
usage patterns, no further inquiry is possible. An observer may choose
to follow the prediction or disregard it, but she has no way of
contextualizing it-of asking whether, all things considered, the
prediction seems more plausibly correct than not. 156
unfairly."). Interestingly, the principle also runs the other way-we think it important for the state
to be able to tell its side of the story. See, e.g., Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 189-90
(1997) (explaining that "the accepted rule that the prosecution is entitled to prove its case"-and
cannot be forced, as a general matter, to accept a defendant's stipulation as to particular aspects
of a crime-stems from the principle that "[a] syllogism is not a story").
153. Apart from law enforcement searches and seizures, another example that comes to mind
is asset freezes, which can occur based solely on a probable cause finding by a grand jury, "without
an evidentiary hearing" of any kind. Kaley v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1090, 1101 (2014).
154. See supra Section II.A.
155. For example, when judges review warrant applications that primarily (or exclusively)
depend on an informant's testimony, they will often examine the informant's history of reliability
(or lack thereof) to determine if probable cause exists. In other words, judges will ask if another
explanation-i.e., that the informant lied-is plausible. See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 211 F.3d
970, 976 (6th Cir. 2000) (upholding a warrant issued based on testimony from a confidential
informant who was "personally known to the detective who swore the affidavit," and whose
"reliability in criminal matters in which the detective was involved had extended over a five-year
period"). Indeed, this is the motivating principle behind the distinction between anonymous and
non-anonymous informants. See, e.g., Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1688 (2014)
(explaining that an anonymous tip is much more likely to be unreliable because " 'ordinary citizens
generally do not provide extensive recitations of the basis of their everyday observations,' and an
anonymous tipster's veracity is 'by hypothesis largely unknown, and unknowable'" (quoting
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990))).
156. Here, of course, the natural next question is what it would mean to contextualize the
output of an algorithm, and what this contextualization suggests about its relative plausibility.




Apart from safeguarding the constitutional and rule-of-law
values explored above, explanatory standards also serve three key
governance values. First, they have salutary upstream effects: when
officials know they may have to account for decisions later on, the
decisions look different. Officials take greater care; they think twice.157
In other words, the goal of explanatory standards is not simply to enable
judicial oversight. It is also to make judicial supervision largely
superfluous-by encouraging officials to take account of constitutional
and rule-of-law values in the process of decisionmaking. A perfect
system of oversight, after all, is one that never has to be mobilized,
because its deterrent effect is that strong.15 8
Second, explanatory standards serve governance values by
eliciting information about official conduct-a precondition of
democratic and administrative pushback. Consider enforcement
priorities. In the absence of explanations, it might be difficult to know
which forms of wrongdoing police are opting to target. Suppose, for
example, it turns out that in New York City, residences that contain
illegal weapons are divisible into two distinct categories: first,
residences where at least one occupant is connected to street crime; and
second, residences where at least one occupant is a member of a pro-
Second Amendment organization, like the NRA, with an ideological
opposition to gun registration laws. In a legal sense, both residence-
types are linked to the same offense-they involve violations of the
same section of the New York criminal code-but, at a policy level, the
offenses stem from very different causes and present distinct risks (and
reasonable minds might disagree about which version of wrongdoing,
in which contexts, is more important to combat).
agree) that in many contexts, humans lack the computational capacity to perform true Bayesian
analysis, given the sheer difficulty of putting new inputs meaningfully into analytic synthesis with
background probabilities. See COHEN, supra note 25, at 93-115. If Cohen is right, it is unclear that
complex algorithmic outputs can be meaningfully contextualized, given the dynamic reevaluation
of variables that doing so would require. Naturally, what "complexity" means in this context is
among the questions that need to be answered.
157. See, e.g., Joanna C. Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role of Lawsuits
in Law Enforcement Decisionmaking, 57 UCLA L. REV 1023, 1086 (2010) (discussing the effect of
lawsuits as a deterrent on law enforcement actions and arguing that "more robust and effective
information policies and practices can increase the impact of lawsuits on law enforcement
behavior").
158. Cf. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 195--228 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage
Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977) (describing Bentham's panopticon as the perfect instrument of




In a situation like this, would the Contraband Detector locate
the first residence-type, the second, or both? The answer depends, of
course, on the tool's training data. If the data reflects cases involving
street crime, the tool will find the first residence-type; if the data
reflects cases involving ideological opposition to gun registration, the
tool will find the second residence-type; and if the data reflects both
versions, the tool will find both. The problem is that from the bare fact
of the tool's performance rate-eighty percent accuracy across cases-
we do not know which cases the tool picks out. By itself, that is, an
accuracy rate conveys literally nothing about the qualitative
distribution of cases; the two issues run orthogonal. In a normative
sense, however, we might care a good deal about the qualitative
distribution of cases-since that distribution could end up defining
enforcement priorities, at least to the extent that police are relying, in
practice, on the Contraband Detector's guidance. Hence the importance
of explaining the tool's outputs: bereft of an explanation, observers
(whether regulators or members of the public) will have little idea about
the enforcement priorities that have been effectively folded into the
tool's operation.
Third, explanatory standards also yield information through
time; that is, they encourage officials to explore and understand,
instead of blindly capitalizing on, the insights of powerful machines.
And this, in turn, helps ensure that our collective understanding of the
world grows-instead of becoming stunted as more and more functions
are delegated to machines.159
To take an innocuous example: suppose the Contraband
Detector, unbeknownst to the officers using it, uncovers a strong
correlation between drinking at least two cups of coffee a day and
159. In practice, of course, this also has to do with accuracy. In addition to its other pitfalls,
blindly following algorithms, even highly reliable ones, sounds like a recipe for disaster-perhaps
only a marginal disaster, perhaps only a sliver of cases will go wrong, but a disaster nonetheless.
See, e.g., PASQUALE, supra note 13, at 17 (positing that decisions made by companies using
algorithms affect millions and that even small mistakes create "life-changing reclassifications");
Citron, supra note 18, at 1256-57 (enumerating examples of algorithmic governance tools that
have been prone to error, including (1) "benefit management systems" that have issued "hundreds
of thousands of incorrect Medicaid, food stamp, and welfare eligibility determinations"; (2)
algorithms meant to locate " 'dead-beat' parents who owe child support" that sweep in many non-
offenders, triggering automatic garnishment of wages; and (3) counterterrorism tools that, due to
"unsophisticated algorithms and faulty data," end up "generat[ing] high rates of false positives"
with grave law enforcement consequences). For a more lighthearted example along these lines, see
Bruno Waterfield, GPS Failure Leaves Belgian Woman in Zagreb Two Days Later, TELEGRAPH
(Jan. 13, 2013, 3:32 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/belgium/9798779/
GPS-failure-leaves-Belgian-woman-in-Zagreb-two-days-later.html [https://perma.cc/Z5F4-QABX]
(detailing the tragicomic story of Sabine Moreau, a Belgian woman attempting to drive to Brussels,




certain forms of white collar crime. If no one is required to develop
explanations, and searches proceed on the strength of the tool's outputs
alone, this connection may go undiscovered. Police officers primarily
care about catching criminals, not demystifying criminal behavior. And
even in a world of explanations, of course, it may be that the connection
between coffee and criminality has no deeper significance. Coffee
consumption may just be a proxy variable for other, more familiar
predictors of criminality, like depression.
But suppose, for argument's sake, that coffee intake is linked to
criminality-say, because caffeine has a heretofore unknown effect on
impulse control. Surely, this connection is something that we, as a
polity, would like to know. In part, we would like to know about the
connection because it stands to improve law enforcement. But we also
might want to know about it for other reasons.160 Maybe we want to
regulate caffeine intake. Maybe we want to launch an educational
campaign warning young people against caffeine's dangers. And so
forth; the point is that no necessary connection exists between the
governance sphere where an insight initially surfaces and the sphere
where it ends up being most relevant. And the value of explanatory
standards, in this light, is that they encourage insights to surface-they
create incentives for institutional actors, including but not only police,
to understand the tools they employ, which has salutary effects on the
governance system as a whole.
V. JUDICIAL PRUDENCE IN THE AGE OF POWERFUL MACHINES
Alexander Bickel is an uneasy hero today. While most agree that
he made some important contributions to constitutional theory,
including coining the term, "counter-majoritarian difficulty," Bickel is
famous, first and foremost, for combating the progressive impulses of
the Warren Court and for extoling the virtues of judicial "passivity"
161 -
achievements that, in retrospect, have an ambivalent cast at best.
At the core of Bickel's thinking, however, lies an important
concept, indeed one that arguably shaped the entirety of his work:
prudence.162 In Bickel's view, a prudent person-and likewise a prudent
judge-grasps the difficulty of decisionmaking within "complex,
160. Recent revelations about the link between lead paint exposure and criminal propensity
provide a real-world analogy here. See, e.g., James J. Feigenbaum & Christopher Muller, Lead
Exposure and Violent Crime in the Early Twentieth Century, 62 EXPLORATIONS ECON. HIST. 51
(2016).
161. See Anthony T. Kronman, Alexander Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence, 94 YALE L.J. 1567,
1568 (1985) (discussing what Bickel is known for).
162. See id. (arguing that prudence is the underlying concept shaping Bickel's work).
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historically evolved institutions,"163 approaches normative problems
with "measure[d] . . . balance and judgment,"164 and is comfortable,
above all, "liv[ing] with the disharmony between aspiration and
historical circumstance."1 6 5 Thus, prudence is "the antithesis of
principle."16 6 But by this, Bickel did not mean that prudential judgment
is delinked from thoughtful conviction; he meant that when values
collide, there is no formula for deciding which value to prioritize. The
decision must come back to "practical wisdom." 67
This notion of prudence, as advocated by Bickel and developed
by others,168 is typically associated with questions about he proper
role-often a limited one-of courts. Bickel's main example of an
ostensible "principle" that, on closer inspection, turns out to be a matter
of prudence was the political question doctrine,169 the lodestone of
separation of powers law. Likewise, the only place the concept shows up
in existing law is the "prudential" use of justiciability principles, such
as standing, mootness, and abstention, to regulate the scope of judicial
power. 170
Yet nothing in the conceptual fabric of prudence confines it to
the realm of separation of powers. At its core, the virtue is more general;
it is about the limits of reason in the face of normative complexity. To
say that a problem is best resolved by prudence rather than principle is
to express doubt about the possibility of fashioning second-order rules
for navigating the collision between first-order values. Prudence
becomes important, in other words, to the extent that conflict between
competing goods is hard to reduce to fixed equations. When that
happens, case-specific judgments-as opposed to generalized
principles-must carry the day.
163. Id. at 1569.
164. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 137 (1975).
165. Kronman, supra note 161, at 1570.
166. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS 133 (1962) ("The antithesis of principle in an institution that represents decency
and reason is not whim or even expediency, but prudence.").
167. BICKEL, supra note 164, at 23.
168. See, e.g., Bruce G. Peabody, Legislating from the Bench: A Definition and a Defense, 11
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 185, 210 (2007) (defining the judicial prudence school as a "tradition of
legal research argu[ing] that judges are most effective when they carefully husband their
institutional resources, including their prestige and capacity to imprint and confront salient
controversies in public affairs"); id. at 191 n.22 (compiling examples of congressional imitation on
judicial power).
169. See BICKEL, supra note 166, at 183-98 (discussing principles underlying political question
doctrine).
170. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Law and Prudence in the Law of Justiciability: The
Transformation and Disappearance of the Political Question Doctrine, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1203, 1214-




Automation as an enterprise depends on the rejection of
prudence. Automating judgment would require the conflict between
competing goods to be expressed formally; we would need to be able to
discern, with at least rough certainty, the correct balance to strike
between values-so we may design our machines accordingly.171 Thus,
a proponent of automation might reasonably ask: Even if the values
explored in the last Part do, indeed, trade off accuracy, could we not
train machines to navigate the tradeoff? The answer turns, of course, on
what navigation of the tradeoff entails, and, more specifically, on
whether the relationship between competing values is knowable, in a
generalizable way, before the fact.
It was precisely here-regarding the capacity of general
principles to resolve specific collisions of value-that Bickel was
skeptical. In his view, the resolution of tradeoffs depends on the felt
necessities of circumstance, necessities that only make themselves
known in the context of specific cases. And, just as before, the division
between prudence and principle does not mean that prudence, as a
faculty, is unmoored from conviction or reflection. It means simply that
the results of prudential judgment are not easily generalized, and thus
not readily translated into a form-whether a doctrinal test, or a string
of computer code-that can be applied, down the line, in automatic
fashion.
Is there a formula for how tailored the police use of associational
data must be to assuage First Amendment concern? Or the many ways
in which consideration of race in law enforcement and elsewhere may
serve compelling state interests? Or the degree of advanced notice
required to make policing genuinely lawful rather than arbitrary? A full
answer to these questions lies beyond the scope of this Article; it
presents issues long-debated in computer science and philosophy
departments and would no doubt take many volumes to fully
disentangle.
At some level, however, the broad conceptual question-do these
formulae exist in principle?-can be sidestepped in favor of a more
practical conclusion. Even assuming, arguendo, that the formulae do
exist, automating them would require humans to express them in
formal terms-and this, by itself, would be quite a task. Looking back
over the history of constitutional jurisprudence, and, in a sense, the
entire history of the common law, should make one think twice about
how susceptible legal judgment actually is to automation, especially in
areas of normative dispute and multiplicity.
171. See generally WEIZENBAUM, supra note 11.
2017] 1299
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
If sound judgment were reducible to analytic dexterity-if it
were simply the product of intelligence-then machines, presumably,
would have little difficulty taking the reins. There can be little doubt,
in the long run, that computational systems will prove more intelligent
(in this limited sense) than humans. The problem, however, is that
intelligence and soundness of judgment are not the same thing. In the
face of value-pluralism, the judge's claim to expertise is not superior
intellect, but practical wisdom. It is a claim, as Holmes famously put it,
about experience, not reason.172
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has long required police to offer case-specific
theories of wrongdoing before intruding on private life; assurances of
predictive accuracy, standing alone, will not do. In the past, the
rationale for this practice was simple: explanations helped keep
suspicion decisions (roughly) accurate. While that rationale may not
survive the rise of power machines, the need for explanations persists.
Why are some of us and not others subject to the searching gaze of the
state? Explanations are what allow us to answer this question
consistently with our values-through legislation, administrative
rulemaking and, just as importantly, case-specific review by judges.
The era of automation approaches swiftly-and with obvious
allure. Judgment is a fragile enterprise, often a source, as Professor
Owen Fiss once wrote, of "agony."173 It Will surely be tempting, as it
becomes more practicable, to entrust our fates to the power of
computation rather than the wisdom of judgment. The trouble is that
in some domains, judgment is necessary-not because it guarantees
statistical perfection, but because it keeps the exercise of power
intelligible and ensures that arenas like law enforcement, riven as they
are with value-pluralism, maintain some measure of balance.
The last decade, and especially the last handful of years, has
made painfully clear what happens when wide swaths of our polity
come to regard the police as a foreign presence, akin to an occupying
force. By requiring officials to explain why they believe invasions of
privacy are justified, the Fourth Amendment's "plausible cause"
172. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Dover Publications reprt. 1991)
(1881) ("The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience."); see also RICHARD A.
POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 354 (2013) (arguing that judging is "one of the simplest
professional fields," and that success is ultimately about pragmatic reasoning, not intelligence or
theoretical sophistication).
173. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1086 (1984) (describing
settlement and ADR as tempting ideals, insofar as they allow judges-and all of us, as members
of a democratic society-to avoid the "agony of judgment").
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standard will not necessarily make policing more precise. In fact, in the
face of new technology, it may well do the opposite. But it will also
vindicate a core promise of constitutional democracy: that governance
is an outcome of popular sovereignty. That state power is an instrument
we wield, however imperfectly, together-not something thrust upon us
from without.

